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REVERSE NULLIFICATION 
AND EXECUTIVE DISCRETION 
Michael T. Morley 
 The President has broad discretion to refrain from enforcing many civil and criminal laws, 
either in general or under certain circumstances.   The Supreme Court has not only affirmed the 
constitutionality of such under-enforcement, but extolled its virtues.  Most recently, in Arizona v. 
United States, it deployed the judicially created doctrines of obstacle and field preemption to 
invalidate state restrictions on illegal immigrants that mirrored federal law,  in large part to 
ensure that states do not undermine the effects of the President’s decision to refrain from fully 
enforcing federal immigration provisions.   
 Such a broad application of obstacle and field preemption is inconsistent with the text and 
original understanding of the Supremacy Clause and unnecessarily aggrandizes the practical 
extent of executive authority.  The Supremacy Clause prohibits states from attempting to nullify or 
ignore federal laws that they believe are unconstitutional or unwise.  It should not bar states from 
engaging in “reverse nullification” by enacting statutes that mirror federal law to ameliorate the 
effects of executive under- or non-enforcement.  Far from undermining the “law of the land,” 
reverse nullification reinforces it by ensuring that the President cannot effectively amend or nullify 
federal law by declining to enforce it.  The Court should craft an exception to its obstacle and field 
preemption doctrines to accommodate reverse nullification, and Congress should generally include 
an exception permitting reverse nullification in statutes’ express preemption provisions.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The Constitution requires the President to “take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed,”1 yet the Supreme Court repeatedly has 
affirmed that the executive branch generally may decline to enforce 
federal criminal and civil laws as a matter of policy in cases in which 
they disputably would apply.2  Presidents have exercised this discre-
tion vigorously in recent years to enforce only partially or selectively, 
or even refrain from enforcing, laws they have been unable to change 
through traditional legislative channels.3  Some have defended such 
under-enforcement as a form of self-help against congressional in-
transigence,4 an exercise of “stewardship” by the President,5 a com-
ponent of the President’s “completion power”6 or “enforcement pow-
er,”7 or an “extra-legislative veto.”8 
 
 1 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 2 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (“[A]n agency’s decision not to prose-
cute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally com-
mitted to [its] absolute discretion.”); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) 
(“[T]he decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a 
grand jury, generally rests entirely in [the prosecutor’s] discretion.”); see, e.g., Arizona v. 
United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) (holding that the executive branch may de-
cline to enforce immigration laws in particular cases based on “immediate human con-
cerns” and the “equities of an individual case”). 
 3 See David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 18–19 (2014) (dis-
cussing how the actions of President Bush and President Obama “drew significant atten-
tion” to questions of Presidential authority to refrain from enforcing or defending the 
constitutionality of federal legislation); see also Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and 
Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 673–74 (2014) (describing some of President 
Obama’s nonenforcement policies).  Scholars have taken opposing views regarding the 
legitimacy of President Obama’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”), 
which will allow nearly two million undocumented aliens to remain in the country despite 
their failure to comply with immigration law and Congress’s refusal to enact the DREAM 
Act.  Compare Lauren Gilbert, Obama’s Ruby Slippers:  Enforcement Discretion in the Absence of 
Immigration Reform, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 255, 306 (2013) (defending DACA’s constitutional-
ity), with Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On:  The Obama Administration’s 
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. 
REV. 781, 785 (2013) (challenging DACA’s constitutionality). 
 4 Pozen, supra note 3, at 18–19. 
 5 Peter Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law:  Presidential Stewardship, Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion, and the Separation of Powers, 94 B.U. L. REV. 105, 107–08 (2014) (defending the 
President’s refusal to enforce federal immigration law under DACA as an exercise of his 
“stewardship” power to “protect both ‘intending Americans’ and resident foreign nation-
als from violations of law by nonfederal sovereigns”). 
 6 Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280, 
2282. 2293–95 (2006) (explaining the President’s completion power as “an Article II 
power of some uncertain scope to complete a legislative scheme,” in part by exercising 
discretion over enforement). 
 7 Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1039 (2013) (argu-
ing that, under the President’s “enforcement power,” he “acts permissibly when he uses 
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The President’s broad authority to refrain from enforcing federal 
statutes is bolstered by a range of ancillary doctrines that further insu-
late his decisions from judicial review, such as restrictions on Article 
III standing to challenge non-enforcement decisions,9 judicial reluc-
tance to allow aggrieved parties to enforce statutes themselves by rec-
ognizing implied rights of action,10 and refusal to recognize a due 
process right to adequate enforcement of the law.11  Some prominent 
scholars in recent years have come to embrace and even celebrate the 
near-limitless discretion for the Executive that results.12 
In our federal system of government, states share sovereignty with 
the federal government over most aspects of domestic life.13  As sepa-
rate sovereigns—a substantial number of which invariably will be con-
trolled by officials not of the President’s political party14—states pre-
sent a potentially viable alternative for enforcing many federal laws 
that the executive branch will not.  When the executive branch un-
dermines or effectively nullifies a federal law by refusing to enforce it, 
a state may engage in “reverse nullification” by enforcing materially 
comparable or identical state laws.  Whereas states historically en-
gaged in traditional nullification by ignoring and undermining fed-
eral laws they believed to be unconstitutional, reverse nullification 
 
enforcement discretion and prioritization—including nonenforcement—to advance poli-
cy goals,” so long as he can “articulate a reasonable statutory basis” for his actions). 
 8 Michael Sant’Ambrogio, The Extra-Legislative Veto, 102 GEO. L.J. 351, 361 (2014) (arguing 
that the President may exercise an “extra-legislative veto” by “not enforcing a law, either 
in whole or in part,” with the goal of “checking, weakening, or curbing a statutory man-
date”). 
 9 Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[A] private citizen lacks a judicially 
cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”). 
 10 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288–89 (2001) (establishing a three-prong test 
for recognizing implied rights of action); see, e.g., Brunner v. Ohio Republican Party, 555 
U.S. 5, 6 (2008) (per curiam) (rejecting challenge to Ohio Secretary of State’s refusal to 
update voting records as required by the Help America Vote Act because that statute did 
not create a private right of action); see also Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285 
(2002) (applying similar test for plaintiffs seeking to sue state officials under § 1983 for 
refusing to enforce laws). 
 11 See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005) (holding that the police 
did not violate a woman’s procedural due process rights by failing to enforce a restraining 
order against her husband); see also DeShaney v. Winnebego Cnty. Dept. Soc. Servs., 489 
U.S. 189 (1989) (holding that a county department of social services did not violate a 
child’s substantive due process rights by failing to protect him from his father’s violence). 
 12 See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND:  AFTER THE 
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 5 (2010) (embracing broad executive power). 
 13 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1082 (2014) (exam-
ining state power). 
 14 Id. at 1080 (“States oppose federal policy because they are governed by individuals who 
affiliate with a different political party than do those in charge at the national level, not 
because they are states as such.”). 
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enables states to implement federal requirements and prohibitions 
that federal executive officials would allow to languish ignored. 
Modern preemption doctrine, however, hinders states’ ability to 
play this role.  A federal law naturally preempts state law when it ex-
pressly supersedes or prohibits states from enacting certain types of 
provisions (express preemption),15 or when it is impossible for a per-
son to comply with both a federal and state mandate (conflict 
preemption).16  Federal law also precludes enforcement of state law 
when a court determines that Congress implicitly intended to “occu-
py the field,” so as to bar state legislation concerning a particular area 
(field preemption),17 or that a certain state law may frustrate or im-
pede the objectives of the federal statute (obstacle preemption).18  
Field preemption and obstacle preemption prevent states from enact-
ing laws that are fully consistent with—or even simply reiterate—
federal requirements.  These doctrines indirectly enhance the Execu-
tive’s enforcement discretion by guaranteeing the Executive a mo-
nopoly on the enforcement of many standards and prohibitions set 
forth in federal law.   
This Article argues that field preemption and obstacle preemp-
tion should be abandoned, at least insofar as they prohibit states from 
enacting and enforcing requirements or prohibitions that mirror 
federal ones.  Preemption arises under the Supremacy Clause, from 
the notion that federal statutes comprise part of “the supreme Law of 
the Land.”19  The Clause prevents states from nullifying or ignoring 
federal law, although they generally remain free to attempt to oppose 
and undermine it in less direct ways.20  When states enforce their own 
 
 15 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 
203 (1983) (“It is well established that within constitutional limits Congress may pre-empt 
state authority by so stating in express terms.”); see also English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 
72, 78 (1990) (noting the same). 
 16 See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963) (“[A] holding 
of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable and requires no inquiry into congressional 
design where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibil-
ity.”). 
 17 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (stating that field preemp-
tion occurs when an “Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so 
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws 
on the same subject”). 
 18 See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000) (explaining “obstacle 
preemption”); see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (same). 
 19 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 20 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 
1256, 1258–59 (2009) (noting that states engage in “uncooperative federalism” when they 
attempt to frustrate the implementation of federal law); see also Ernest A. Young, A Re-
search Agenda for Uncooperative Federalists, 48 TULSA L. REV. 427, 428 (2012) (same). 
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parallel mandates in the face of federal under- or non-enforcement, 
however, they are not undermining or nullifying federal law.  To the 
contrary, they are engaging in reverse nullification:  enforcing feder-
ally established requirements or prohibitions despite the federal Ex-
ecutive’s inability or refusal to do so. 
State enforcement of parallel state-level mandates can be an effec-
tive alternate means of enforcing federal requirements, neatly cir-
cumventing the substantial doctrinal and practical obstacles to com-
pelling the Executive to enforce them.21  The Supreme Court’s 
 
   In recent years, a burgeoning body of scholarship has arisen concerning the extent to 
which efforts by many states to oppose perceived overreach by the Obama administration 
constitutes nullification.  See Sanford Levinson, The Twenty-First Century Rediscovery of Nulli-
fication and Secession in American Political Rhetoric:  Frivolousness Incarnate or Serious Arguments 
To Be Wrestled With?, 67 ARK. L. REV. 17, 27–28 (2014) (arguing that recent “nullification-
like actions” are based on “‘zombie’ constitutional arguments” that were “thought to be 
long dead,” but are “stalking us and threatening our brains”); see also Keely N. Kight, 
Comment, Back to the Future:  The Revival of the Theory of Nullification, 65 MERCER L. REV. 
521, 524 (2014) (“[R]ecently the nullification doctrine has grown in popularity as politi-
cal disunion reaches new heights and as states respond to the expansion of the federal 
government.”); cf. Kris W. Kobach, Immigration Nullification:  In-State Tuition and Lawmakers 
Who Disregard the Law, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 473, 521 (2006/2007) (“The deci-
sion of ten states to violate 8 U.S.C. § 1623 is more than just an interesting sideshow in 
the larger theater of U.S. immigration policy; it is a preempted action that should be in-
validated by the courts reviewing the statutes in question.”).   
   State opposition to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
148, 124 Stat. 119 (Mar. 23, 2010), as amended by Health Care and Education Reconcilia-
tion Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029, has emerged as a particular focal 
point of much of the literature about nullification.  Compare Ryan Card, Comment, Can 
States “Just Say No” to Federal Health Care Reform?  The Constitutional and Political Implications 
of State Attempts to Nullify Federal Law, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1795, 1829 (“This opposition ef-
fort by states against health care reform constitutes state nullification of federal 
law . . . [and] is an unconstitutional exercise of state power.”), with Ryan S. Hunter, Sound 
and Fury, Signifying Nothing: Nullification and the Question of Gubernatorial Executive Power in 
Idaho, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 659, 663 (2013) (“Executive Order No. 2011-03 is not actual nul-
lification, but is merely an act of uncooperative federalism done as part of a larger effort 
to interpose the state between its citizens and the federal government to prevent, or at 
least slow, implementation of the [Affordable Care Act].”), and Robert S. Claiborne, Jr., 
Comment, Why Virginia’s Challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Did Not 
Invoke Nullification, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 917 (2012) (arguing that Virginia’s constitutional 
challenges to the Affordable Care Act were not exercises of nullification).   
 21 See supra notes 2, 9–11; see also Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 748 (2011) (“Enforcement authority creates a state-level check against 
underenforcement by federal agencies.”); Amanda M. Rose, State Enforcement of National 
Policy:  A Contextual Approach (with Evidence from the Securities Realm), 97 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 
1345, 1356–57 (2013) (“The benefit of concurrent enforcement most emphasized in this 
recent literature is the ability of state regulators to remedy under-enforcement by poten-
tially captured federal agencies.”); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Feder-
alism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 290 (2005) (“[R]egulatory redundancy constitutes a fail-safe 
mechanism—an additional source of protection if one or the other government should 
fail to offer adequate safeguards.”). 
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current approach to field and obstacle preemption, however, treats 
the Executive’s unilateral decision to decline to enforce a federal 
statute in certain cases as constitutionally equivalent to the underly-
ing statute itself, entitled to respect as the law of the land. 22  This un-
derstanding bolsters executive discretion beyond its already generous 
bounds, and extends the Supremacy Clause to the Executive’s mere 
policy determinations that do not, in fact, rise to the level of “law.”  
While the Executive may seldom be compelled to enforce federal re-
quirements or prohibitions against its will, its reticence should not 
preclude other sovereigns from doing so. 
Of course, when a federal law affirmatively licenses or authorizes a 
particular act, state interference—including the imposition of identi-
cal standards at the state level—would directly contradict the statute.  
In the absence of such express federal authorization, however, when 
a federal statute imposes particular requirements or prohibits certain 
conduct, and the executive branch simply declines to enforce those 
provisions, the Executive’s acts do not amount to implicit federal au-
thorization.  States are not bound to defer to such executive policy 
determinations, but rather are free to enact their own parallel provi-
sions to help to enforce the true “law of the land”:  the underlying 
federal statute.23 
Part I begins by exploring traditional state nullification of federal 
law throughout American history.  True nullification, unlike reverse 
nullification, is a squarely unconstitutional attempt by a state to ig-
nore federal laws or declare them void.  Part II explores the drafting 
history of the Supremacy Clause and the Framers’ intent underlying 
it, demonstrating that reverse nullification is consistent with the orig-
inal understanding of the Constitution.  Part III analyzes the various 
preemption doctrines the Supreme Court has crafted to implement 
the Supremacy Clause.  It explains why the Court should modify its 
field and obstacle preemption doctrines to permit states to engage in 
reverse nullification by enacting requirements that are materially 
identical to—and do not contravene—federal statutes, with special 
emphasis on the Supreme Court’s recent invalidation of Arizona’s 
immigration statutes in Arizona v. United States.24  Part IV concludes by 
addressing potential objections to reverse nullification, including 
concerns under the Take Care Clause. 25 
 
 22 See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502–07 (2012). 
 23 Adam B. Cox, Enforcement Redundancy and the Future of Immigration Law, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 
31, 37. 
 24 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012). 
 25 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
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Federalism and separation of powers generally are studied as sep-
arate mechanisms for limiting the Government’s power and protect-
ing individual freedom.26  Through reverse nullification, federalism 
also can help bolster separation of powers, allowing separate sover-
eigns to enforce the standards set forth in congressional enactments 
despite the reticence of the federal Executive.  In an age when sepa-
ration of powers is seen in legal realist terms as little more than a ve-
hicle for competition and conflict between the two major political 
parties,27 reverse nullification harnesses such rivalry to ensure the en-
forcement of federal requirements and prohibitions and help check 
the Executive’s nearly limitless power and discretion.28 
I.  NULLIFICATION 
Revisiting states’ periodic attempts throughout American history 
to unconstitutionally nullify federal law can yield insight into the va-
lidity of reverse nullification.  The earliest attempts at nullification 
came shortly after the Constitution was ratified.  In 1798, the Federal-
ist Congress enacted the Alien and Sedition Acts,29 which made it a 
crime, among other things, to “defame” the Government, the Presi-
dent, or either House of Congress; “bring them . . . into contempt or 
disrepute”; or “excite . . . hatred” against them through “false, scan-
dalous and malicious” writings.30 
The Kentucky and Virginia legislatures enacted resolutions assert-
ing that states had the right to declare the Acts unconstitutional and 
void.  The first Kentucky resolution was secretly drafted by Anti-
Federalist and Democratic-Republican Thomas Jefferson while he was 
Vice President.31  It declared that any act of the federal Government 
that exceeds the “certain definite powers” that the Constitution 
 
 26 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 3 (2d ed. 2002) 
(discussing federalism and separation of powers as performing separate functions, inde-
pendent of each other). 
 27 See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 2311, 2327 (2006) (demonstrating that the different branches of federal govern-
ment “serve a politically contingent role as vehicles for party competition”). 
 28 See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 12, at 112–13 ([T]he basic aspiration of liberal legal-
ism to constrain the executive through statutory law has largely failed.”). 
 29 Act of July 14, 1798, 5 Cong. Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596; An Act Respecting Alien Enemies, 5 
Cong. Ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (July 6, 1798); An Act Concerning Aliens, 5 Cong. Ch. 58, 1 Stat. 
570 (June 25, 1798). 
 30 Act of July 14, 1798, 5 Cong. Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596, 596. 
 31 ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 435 (1935). 
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grants to it is “unauthoritative, void, and of no force.”32  It further 
specified that each State “has an equal right to judge for itself” 
whether the Government is acting unconstitutionally.33  The Alien 
and Sedition Acts both exceeded Congress’s Article I powers and vio-
lated the First Amendment, and therefore were “altogether void and 
of no force.”34  The resolution concluded by declaring that Kentucky 
would not “submit to undelegated & consequently unlimited powers,” 
and asked the other states of the Union to “concur in declaring these 
acts void and of no force.”35  Jefferson elsewhere elaborated that, be-
cause the Constitution creates a “compact” of independent states, 
“every single one” of them has “an equal right” to interpret the Con-
stitution “and to require its observance.”36  Consequently, a federal 
law should be deemed nullified if two-thirds of the state legislatures 
in the nation declare it to be unconstitutional.37 
Virginia’s resolution was drafted by James Madison,38 who was a 
Federalist at the time the Constitution was drafted, but later became a 
Democratic-Republican and would go on to become Secretary of 
State and President.  The resolution declared that when the federal 
government engages in a “deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exer-
cise” of powers that the Constitution denies it, the states “have the 
right, and are in duty bound, to interpose for arresting the pro(gress) 
[sic] of the evil, and for maintaining . . . [their] authorities, rights 
and liberties . . . .”39  It further specified that the Sedition Act was 
“expressly and positively forbidden” by the First Amendment.40  Tak-
en together, the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions argued that “the 
constitutional powers of Congress should be strictly construed and 
that states had some role to play in checking overexertions of con-
gressional power.”41 
Interestingly, this first assertion of a nullification power was largely 
rejected.  No other states concurred with or endorsed the resolutions, 
 
 32 Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, para. I (Nov. 10, 1798), reprinted in 30 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON:  1 JANUARY 1798 TO 31 JANUARY 1799, at 529, 550 (Barbara B. Oberg 
& J. Jefferson Looney eds., 2003). 
 33 Id. para. I, at 551. 
 34 Id. para. II–III, at 552–53. 
 35 Id. para. IX, at 555–56. 
 36 MERRILL D. PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NEW NATION:  A BIOGRAPHY 994–95 
(1970). 
 37 Id. 
 38 Virginia Resolutions of 1798, reprinted in 17 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 185, 188 (Da-
vid B. Mattern et al. eds. 1991) [hereinafter MADISON PAPERS]. 
 39 Id. para. 3, at 189. 
 40 Id. para. 5, at 189. 
 41 ANTHONY J. BELLIA JR., FEDERALISM 47 (2011). 
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“and several Federalist legislatures adopted statements expressly con-
demning the Resolutions and endorsing the constitutionality of the 
Alien and Sedition Acts.”42  The Kentucky legislature responded by 
enacting a second, much shorter resolution.43  It reaffirmed that, 
when the federal government enacts laws that violate the Constitu-
tion, the “several states who formed that instrument, being sovereign 
and independent, have the unquestionable right to judge of its in-
fraction, and . . .  nullification, by those sovereignties, of all unauthor-
ized acts . . . is the rightful remedy.”44 
Similarly, the Virginia legislature approved a committee report 
penned by Madison explaining and defending its resolution.45  Char-
acterizing the Constitution as a compact among the states, it declared 
that the states themselves must “decide in the last resort” questions 
concerning its meaning.46  The report explained that states must have 
the authority to “interpos[e]” themselves to “arrest the progress of 
the evil” caused by unconstitutional federal laws, preserve the Consti-
tution, “provide for the safety of the parties to it,” and prevent the 
government from usurping power and violating individual rights.47 
The resolutions did not have any immediate legal effect and were 
unsuccessful in blocking enforcement of the Alien and Sedition 
Acts.48  They nevertheless laid out a theory of constitutional interpre-
tation and the nature of the federal system that the Democratic-
Republican party embraced.  With Jefferson and then Madison serv-
ing as President, these resolutions “assumed an increasingly im-
portant role as the canonical statements of the Republicans’ constitu-
 
 42 H. Jefferson Powell, The Principles of ‘98:  An Essay in Historical Retrieval, 80 VA. L. REV. 689, 
705 (1994); see also Daniel A. Farber, Judicial Review and Its Alternatives: An American Tale, 
38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 415, 434 (2003) (“None of the other states supported the Resolu-
tions, and several condemned them.”); Kenneth M. Stampp, The Concept of a Perpetual Un-
ion, 65 J. AM. HIST. 5, 22 (1978) (“Nine states, all controlled by the Federalists, responded 
with assertions that the federal judiciary was the proper judge of the constitutionality of 
acts of Congress.”). 
 43 See Kentucky Resolutions of 1799 (Nov. 14, 1799), reprinted in 4, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL 
STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 544, 545 (Jona-
than Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836). 
 44 Id. 
 45 The Report of 1800, reprinted in MADISON PAPERS, supra note 38, at 317 [hereinafter Re-
port of 1800]; see also Kurt T. Lash, James Madison’s Celebrated Report of 1800:  The Transfor-
mation of the Tenth Amendment, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 165, 185–86 (2006) (discussing the 
report’s significance). 
 46 Report of 1800, supra note 45, at 317. 
 47 Id. 
 48 See Claiborne, supra note 20, at 932–33; see also supra note 42 and accompanying test. 
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tional vision.”49  Indeed, throughout their terms as President, both 
men generally adhered to the resolutions’ narrow vision of the scope 
of the federal government’s authority.50 
The Supreme Court’s rulings over the decades that followed flatly 
rejected the notion of nullification.  The Court invalidated state laws 
and state supreme court rulings that it concluded violated the Consti-
tution, even when states claimed to be faithfully applying their own 
independent interpretations of it.  The foundation for this authority, 
of course, lies in Marbury v. Madison.51  Although that case dealt with a 
federal statute, the Court’s reasoning applies equally to state laws:  “It 
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to 
say what the law is . . . .  [As] the constitution is superior to any ordi-
nary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary 
act, must govern the case to which they both apply.”52 
In Fletcher v. Peck, the Court overturned the State of Georgia’s at-
tempt to engage in what might be called “self-nullification.”53  Several 
members of the state legislature had been bribed into voting for a law 
through which the state sold land to certain investors.54  Those inves-
tors, in turn, sold the land to third parties who purchased it in good 
faith.55  After the bribery scheme was publicly revealed, the legislators 
were voted out of office.  Their successors enacted a new statute re-
pealing the original law on the grounds that the corruption sur-
rounding it rendered it unconstitutional.56  The latter statute was en-
titled, “AN ACT declaring null and void a certain usurped act.”57   
As Gerald Leonard explains: 
 
 49 Powell, supra note 42, at 705; see also H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of 
Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 927 (1985) (“[T]he Resolutions proved to be among 
the most influential extraconstitutional, nonjudicial texts in American constitutional his-
tory.”). 
 50 See DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 213–14 
(1994) (analyzing Jefferson’s exercises of Executive power); see, e.g., James Madison, Veto 
Message (Mar. 3, 1817) (vetoing public works bill because of the “insuperable difficulty I 
feel in reconciling the bill with the Constitution”), reprinted in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 584, 584 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896) 
[hereinafter PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS]. 
 51 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177–78 (1803). 
 52 Id. 
 53 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); see also Gerald Leonard, Fletcher v. Peck and Constitutional 
Development in the Early United States, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1843 (2014) (discussing the cir-
cumstances surrounding the case). 
 54 Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 129. 
 55 Id. at 129–30. 
 56 See Leonard, supra note 53, at 1845 (explaining aftermath of the corruption). 
 57 C. PETER MCGRATH, YAZOO:  LAW AND POLITICS IN THE NEW REPUBLIC:  THE CASE OF 
FLETCHER V. PECK 127–29 (1966) (reprinting text of repealing act). 
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Georgia’s action—almost unintelligible to us today—asserted the legisla-
ture’s right to review the constitutionality of legislation, without recourse 
to the courts and regardless of the federal constitutional protection for 
contracts.  The 1796 Act was not a conventional repeal but a finding and 
declaration that the 1795 Act had never been law . . . . [T]he people and 
their delegates in the legislature reviewed the original Act and declared 
the land grant void—without effect from the moment of its supposed en-
actment—on the basis of the fraud and other constitutional defects.58 
Following the repeal, the third-party purchasers sued the original 
investors from whom they had purchased the land.  The purchasers 
claim that the investors had breached their sale contract because, due 
to the repeal, they had failed to convey good title to the land.59  The 
purchasers were thus arguing against the validity of their own title.60 
The Supreme Court rejected their claim and sided with the inves-
tors.  It held that the initial statute constituted a contract between the 
state and the original investors, and so the subsequent law purporting 
to repeal it impaired the state’s contractual obligations61 in violation 
of the U.S. Constitution’s Contracts Clause.62  In doing so, the Court 
rejected the view that either the Georgia legislature or the public that 
specifically elected legislators who would nullify the sale had the au-
thority to make a final, binding decision as to whether either of the 
statutes at issue was constitutional. 
Three years later, the Court went even further in Martin v. 
Hunter’s Lessee. 63  It overturned the Virginia Supreme Court’s applica-
tion of a federal treaty, as well as that court’s subsequent attempt to 
ignore the Supreme Court’s ruling on constitutional grounds.  The 
Treaty of 1794 between the United States and Great Britain guaran-
teed the right of British subjects to own land in the United States.64  
 
 58 Leonard, supra note 53, at 1845–46. 
 59 Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 131–32. 
 60 Some commentators have opined that the suit was collusive.  Under this view, the original 
investors induced third-party purchasers to sue in hope that the court would reject their 
breach of contract claims, to establish a precedent that would confirm the validity of the 
investor’s title to other lands they had purchased pursuant to the original statute.  
MCGRATH, supra note 57, at 53–54; Leonard, supra note 53, at 1853; cf. Lindsay G. Robert-
son, “A Mere Feigned Case”:  Rethinking the Fletcher v. Peck Conspiracy and Early Republican 
Legal Culture, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 249, 259–60, 264 (suggesting that the plaintiffs’ claim 
might have involved “legal fictions” to avoid onerous pleading obstacles and obtain an ad-
judication on the merits of an important issue). 
 61 Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 139. 
 62 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 63 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304 (1816); see also Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 
Cranch) 603, 620–21, 627 (1813), on remand sub nom. Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. (1 Munf.) 
1 (1815), rev’d sub nom. Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304. 
 64 Treaty of Amity, Commerce & Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116, Art. 
IX. 
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The Virginia Supreme Court had held that the treaty did not apply to 
a British claimant who had been devised land years before the it went 
into effect, because ownership of the land had passed to the Com-
monwealth at the time of the devise.65  The Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that the land had not automatically passed to the Common-
wealth by operation of law at that time.66  And the Treaty of 1794 now 
precluded the Commonwealth from attempting to confiscate it.67  
That treaty, “being the supreme law of the land, confirmed the title 
to [the British claimant and] his heirs and assigns, and protected him 
from any forfeiture by reason of alienage.”68  Any inchoate claim that 
the Commonwealth may have possessed “has by the operation of the 
treaty become ineffectual and void.”69 
On remand, rather than implementing the Supreme Court’s rul-
ing, the Virginia Supreme Court unanimously “declined” its “obedi-
ence” to the Supreme Court’s mandate.70  It opined that § 25 of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, which granted the Supreme Court jurisdiction 
to hear appeals from state supreme courts, was unconstitutional.  The 
Supreme Court therefore had lacked jurisdiction to overturn the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court’s earlier judgment.71  Thus, the state supreme 
court claimed the authority to be the final arbiter in the case of the 
Treaty’s meaning.72 
The case returned to the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that Ar-
ticle III allows it to hear appeals in federal-question cases from state 
courts.73  Embracing a vision of federal judicial supremacy, the Court 
pointed out that federal courts may hold a state’s legislative and ex-
ecutive acts “to be of no legal validity” if “they are found to be contra-
ry to the constitution.”74  The “exercise of the same right over [a 
state’s] judicial tribunals is not a higher or more dangerous act of 
sovereign power.”75 
 
 65 Hunter v. Fairfax’s Devisee, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 218, 229–30 (1810), rev’d sub nom. Fairfax’s 
Devisee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, on remand sub nom. Hunter, 18 Va. (1 Munf.) 1, rev’d sub 
nom. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304. 
 66 Fairfax’s Devisee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 620–21. 
 67 Id. at 627. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. (1 Munf.) 1, 58–59 (1815), rev’d sub nom. Martin v. Hunter’s Les-
see, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 323–24 (1816). 
 71 Id. at 58. 
 72 Id. at 58–59. 
 73 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 342, 351 (1816). 
 74 Id. at 344. 
 75 Id. 
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A few years later, the Supreme Court confirmed its ability to re-
view state supreme courts’ rulings concerning the U.S. Constitution 
and federal laws in criminal cases, as well, in Cohens v. Virginia.76  The 
Court explained that it must possess authority to review state courts’ 
interpretations of the U.S. Constitution and federal laws to avoid 
“prostrat[ing] . . . the government and its laws at the feet of every 
State in the Union” and allowing “the course of the government” to 
be, “at any time, arrested by the will of one of its members.”77  It fur-
ther recognized that “[d]ifferent States may entertain different opin-
ions on the true construction of the constitutional powers of Con-
gress.”78  The Constitution therefore “confer[s] on the [federal] 
judicial department the power of construing the constitution and 
laws of the Union in every case, in the last resort.”79  Together, 
Hunter’s Lessee and Cohens precluded state courts from ignoring feder-
al laws and treaties based on their own, independent constructions of 
the Constitution. 
Taxation disputes over the Bank of the United States led Ohio to 
resort to armed violence to defend its asserted prerogative to inter-
pret the Constitution for itself.  In McCulloch v. Maryland, the Su-
preme Court had held that it was unconstitutional for states to tax the 
bank.80  Several states, including Ohio, declared they would neverthe-
less continue to do so.81  After the bank obtained a federal court or-
der prohibiting Ohio from collecting its tax, state officers raided the 
bank’s Chillicothe branch and seized over $120,000.82  Federal agents, 
in response, raided the Ohio Treasury and took nearly $100,000; the 
bank obtained a federal judgment for the remaining funds, which the 
Supreme Court affirmed.83 
Throughout this period, states periodically enacted resolutions 
proclaiming their authority to oppose and ignore federal actions that 
they believed violated the Constitution.84  These resolutions generally 
 
 76 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). 
 77 Id. at 385. 
 78 Id. at 386. 
 79 Id. at 388. 
 80 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 81 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 276 (5th ed. 2007). 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id.  In Osborne v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 828 (1824), the Court 
held that Article III permitted Congress to grant federal courts jurisdiction over any law-
suits the national bank initiates. 
 84 See, e.g., Pennsylvania House of Representatives, Report on the Governor’s Message Rela-
tive to the Mandamus of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Gideon 
Olmstead (Mar. 1, 1809) (declaring that, “as guardians of State rights,” states “cannot 
permit an infringement of those rights, by an unconstitutional exercise of power in the 
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were politically motivated, enacted to oppose measures that would 
disadvantage the enacting state in some way.  Massachusetts, for ex-
ample, issued a resolution declaring the government’s decision to 
compromise with Great Britain over the nation’s northeastern 
boundaries “wholly null and void, and in no way obligatory upon the 
government or people” of Massachusetts or Maine, because it de-
prived Massachusetts of “large tracts of land.”85 
The Governor of Pennsylvania relied on the theory underlying the 
Virginia Resolution in an appeal to then-President Madison concern-
ing a dispute between the federal government and Pennsylvania over 
proceeds from the sale of a prize vessel.86  A federal prize court had 
awarded Captain Gideon Olmstead a judgment entitling him to the 
proceeds from the sale of a captured vessel from the Revolutionary 
War.87  The Pennsylvania legislature, believing the state to be entitled 
to a portion of those proceeds, enacted a statute requiring the Gov-
ernor to “call out an armed force to prevent the execution” of that 
judgment.88  Fearing armed violence, the district court judge declined 
to issue any orders to enforce his judgment. 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted Olmstead a writ of mandamus 
ordering the trial court to enforce the judgment.89  The Court stated, 
If the legislatures of the several states may, at will, annul the judgments of 
the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired under 
those judgments, the constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery; and 
 
United States Courts” by the federal government), reprinted in THE VIRGINIA AND 
KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS OF 1798 AND ‘99; WITH JEFFERSON’S ORIGINAL DRAUGHT 
THEREOF, ALSO, MADISON’S REPORT, CALHOUN’S ADDRESS, RESOLUTIONS OF THE SEVERAL 
STATES IN RELATION TO STATE RIGHTS, WITH OTHER DOCUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE 
JEFFERSONIAN DOCTRINES OF ‘98, at 74, 75 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1832) [hereinafter 
JEFFERSONIAN DOCTRINES OF ‘98]. 
 85 Massachusetts Legislature, Resolution Declaring the Late Treaty with Great Britain Rela-
tive to the North-Eastern Boundary “Null and Void” (Feb. 9, 1830), reprinted in 
JEFFERSONIAN DOCTRINES OF ‘98, supra note 84, at 79 (emphasis omitted); see also Legisla-
ture of Maine, Report and Recommendation (Feb. 28, 1831) (resolving that the Govern-
ment’s negotiations “tended to violate the Constitution of the United States, and to im-
pair the sovereign rights and powers of the State of Maine, and that Maine is not bound 
by the Constitution to submit to the decision which is or shall be made”), reprinted in 
JEFFERSONIAN DOCTRINES OF ‘98, supra note 84, at 79.  
 86 Barry Friedman & Erin F. Delaney, Becoming Supreme:  The Federal Foundation of Judicial Su-
premacy, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1153–54 & 1154 n.78 (2011); see also FORREST 
MCDONALD, STATES’ RIGHTS AND THE UNION:  IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO, 1776–1876, at 63–65 
(2000) (discussing the incident in greater detail). 
 87 MCDONALD, supra note 86, at 63–64. 
 88 United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 115 (1809). 
 89 Id. at 115, 141. 
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the nation is deprived of the means of enforcing its laws by the instru-
mentality of its own tribunals.90 
It held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the federal courts 
from hearing the case, since the state of Pennsylvania itself was not 
actually a party to any of the proceedings.91  The Court concluded by 
expressing “extreme regret” at the need for its involvement.92 
Pennsylvania Governor Thomas McKean persisted in ignoring the 
Court’s ruling, and ordered the state militia to protect the home of 
the state treasurer, who held the contested funds.93  The U.S. Marshal 
for the district, in response, “summoned a posse of two thousand 
men, setting the stage for a bloody showdown.”94  The Governor 
sought relief from President Madison, appealing to the theory of 
states’ rights Madison articulated in the Virginia Resolutions, but was 
rebuffed.95  The state ultimately backed down and complied with the 
Supreme Court’s order without violence.96  
States also declined to enforce federal laws with which they disa-
greed.  In the years leading up to the War of 1812, Congress enacted 
a series of embargoes that prohibited American vessels from trading 
with foreign countries.97  The Embargo Acts culminated with a provi-
sion prohibiting any vessel bearing cargo from departing a U.S. port 
for any other U.S. port adjacent to a foreign territory without the 
President’s “special permission.”98  These laws crippled commerce in 
New England and triggered widespread resistance.99 
Because the embargoes were flouted, Congress passed the En-
forcement Act of 1809 to allow the President to use the army and mi-
litia to enforce them.100  The Massachusetts House of Representatives 
enacted a resolution declaring the Enforcement Act to be “‘unconsti-
 
 90 Id. at 136. 
 91 Id. at 139, 141. 
 92 Id. at 141. 
 93 MCDONALD, supra note 86, at 65. 
 94 Hunter, supra note 20, at 672. 
 95 Id. 
 96 MCDONALD, supra note 86, at 65; see also Hunter, supra note 20, at 672 (describing how 
the State of Pennsylvania’s “retreat in its position” prevented “actual armed conflict be-
tween the state and federal government”). 
 97 See Act of Apr. 25, 1808, 10 Cong. Ch. 66, 2 Stat. 499; Act of Mar. 12, 1808, 10 Cong. Ch. 
33, 2 Stat. 473; Act of Jan. 9, 1808, 10 Cong. Ch. 8, 2 Stat. 453; Act of Dec. 22, 1807, 10 
Cong. Ch. 5, 2 Stat. 451. 
 98 Act of Apr. 25, 1808, 10 Cong. Ch. 66, 2 Stat. at 500. 
 99 Bradley D. Hays, A Place for Interposition?  What John Taylor of Caroline and the Embargo Crisis 
Have to Offer Regarding Resistance to the Bush Constitution, 67 MD. L. REV. 200, 211–12 
(2007). 
100 Act of January 9, 1809, 10 Cong. Ch. 5, 2 Stat. 506. 
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tutional, and not legally binding on the citizens of this State.’”101  
Likewise, the Rhode Island legislature declared that it had a “du-
ty . . . to interpose” to protect its citizens “from the ruinous inflictions 
of usurped and unconstitutional power.”102  The Connecticut legisla-
ture instructed all state officers, including militia officers, to refuse to 
enforce the embargoes pursuant to the Enforcement Act.103  Presi-
dent Jefferson—who only years before had proclaimed states’ ability 
to interpret the Constitution for themselves—attempted to enforce 
the embargoes over the states’ constitutional objections.  Congress 
responded to this public outcry, however, by repealing the embargoes 
less than two months after passing the Enforcement Act.104 
During the War of 1812, several states went even further.  The 
governors of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Hamp-
shire, and Vermont refused to muster their militias at President Mad-
ison’s order to invade Canada.105 
In the early 1830s, the State of Georgia managed to ignore two 
U.S. Supreme Court orders—a goal at which both Virginia106 and 
Pennsylvania107 had earlier failed.  Georgia enacted a statute provid-
ing that state law applied to all persons within Cherokee Indian terri-
tory.108  Pursuant to that statute, the state tried a Cherokee citizen, 
George “Corn” Tassels, for a murder he allegedly committed on 
 
101 Michael Bahar, The Presidential Intervention Principle: The Domestic Use of the Military and the 
Power of the Several States, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 537, 586–87 (2014) (quoting LEG. OF 
MASS., THE PATRIOTIC PROCEEDINGS OF THE LEGISLATURES, 69, Sess. from Jan. 26 to Mar. 
4, 1809). 
102 Powell, supra note 49, at 934–935 (quoting Report and Resolutions of Rhode Island on 
the Embargo (1809), reprinted in STATE DOCUMENTS ON FEDERAL RELATIONS:  THE STATES 
AND THE UNITED STATES 42, 43–44 (Herman V. Ames ed., 1906) [hereinafter STATE 
DOCUMENTS ON FEDERAL RELATIONS]). 
103 Hays, supra note 99, at 214; see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists:  Federal Admin-
istration and Administrative Law in the Republican Era, 1801–29, 116 YALE L.J. 1636, 1666 
(2007) (describing the Connecticut legislature’s response to what it deemed an unconsti-
tutional exercise of federal power). 
104 Act of Mar. 1, 1809, 10 Cong. Ch. 24, 2 Stat. 528, 533. 
105 H. Richard Uviller & William G. Merkel, The Second Amendment in Context:  The Case of the 
Vanishing Predicate, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 403, 523 (2000). 
106 Hunter v. Fairfax’s Devisee, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 218, 229–30 (1810), rev’d sub nom. Fairfax’s 
Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813), on remand sub nom. Hunter v. 
Martin, 18 Va. (1 Munf.) 1 (1814), rev’d sub nom. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 
Wheat.) 304 (1816); see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (holding 
that the Supreme Court has the power to review state supreme court decisions concern-
ing constitutional issues in criminal cases). 
107 United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809) (holding that legislatures may not 
nullify or ignore federal courts’ judgments). 
108 Act of Dec. 20, 1828, 1828 Ga. Acts 88, 88–89. 
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Cherokee land.109  The Georgia Supreme Court upheld his convic-
tion, holding that the state had “legitimate powers over the Cherokee 
territory.”110  Tassels, represented by former U.S. Attorney General 
William C. Wirt, obtained a writ of error from Chief Justice John Mar-
shall, ordering the State to appear before the U.S. Supreme Court in 
an appeal of the conviction.111  Georgia ignored the order on the 
grounds that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the matter, and hung 
Tassels less than two weeks later, before the Court could consider the 
case on the merits.112 
Another Georgia statute required white people living on Chero-
kee land to obtain a license and take a loyalty oath to the state.113  
Two missionaries were convicted and imprisoned for failing to obtain 
a license and appealed their convictions to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.114  “Because Georgia refused to recognize the Court’s authori-
ty,” it boycotted oral argument.115  Unsurprisingly, the Court held the 
Georgia statute unconstitutional.116 
The Georgia legislature immediately enacted a law providing that 
anyone who attempted to enforce the Supreme Court’s ruling would 
be hanged.117  President Andrew Jackson refused to intervene to en-
force the judgment, stating, “‘The decision of the [S]upreme [C]ourt 
has fell still born . . . and they find that it cannot coerce Georgia to 
yield to its mandate.’”118  Legal tradition contends that Jackson in-
stead proclaimed, “John Marshall has made his order, now let him 
enforce it!”119  Georgia held the missionaries in prison for approxi-
mately ten more months, until the Governor pardoned them to avoid 
embroiling the state in the Nullification Crisis of 1832. 
 
109 E. Nathaniel Gates, Justice Stillborn:  Lies, Lacunae, Incommensurability, and the Judicial Role, 
19 CARDOZO L. REV. 971, 1004–05 (1997). 
110 State v. Tassels, 1 Dud. (Ga.) 229, 236 (1830). 
111 Gates, supra note 109, at 1007. 
112 Id. 
113 Matthew L. Sundquist, Worcester v. Georgia:  A Breakdown in the Separation of Powers, 35 
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 239, 240 (2010/2011); see also Edwin A. Miles, After John Marshall’s Deci-
sion: Worcester v. Georgia and the Nullification Crisis, 39 J. S. LEGAL HIST. 519 (1973) (de-
scribing the sentencing of two white Congregationalist missionaries for residing within 
Cherokee territory without a license). 
114 Miles, supra note 113, at 519. 
115 Sundquist, supra note 113, at 243. 
116 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 540 (1832). 
117 Sundquist, supra note 113, at 246. 
118 Hunter, supra note 20, at 674 (alterations in original) (quoting Letter from Andrew Jack-
son to John Coffee (Apr. 7, 1832), reprinted in 4 CORRESPONDENCE OF ANDREW JACKSON 
429, 430 (John Spencer Bassett ed., 1929)). 
119 Id. 
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As its name suggests, the Nullification Crisis is one of the most no-
table incidents in which a state claimed the authority to ignore feder-
al law.  In 1828120 and 1832,121 Congress imposed tariffs on foreign 
textiles.  The new taxes greatly reduced American demand for British 
products which, in turn, depressed Britain’s demand for cotton from 
southern states.  Southerners referred to the measures as the “Tariff 
of Abominations.”122 
Vice President John C. Calhoun drafted an Exposition and Protest 
against the tariffs for the South Carolina legislature, declaring them 
“unconstitutional, unequal, and oppressive.”123  The Exposition fur-
ther asserted that states had the “right of deciding on the infractions 
of [the federal government’s] powers, and the proper remedy to be 
applied for their correction.” 124  The constitution “clearly implies” 
that states have “a veto or control . . . on the action of the General 
Government, on contested points of authority . . . to prevent the en-
croachments of the General Government on the reserved right of the 
States.”125 
The South Carolina legislature held a state Nullification Conven-
tion on November 24, 1832, which enacted an Ordinance of Nullifi-
cation.  The ordinance declared that the tariffs were “unauthorized 
by the Constitution,” and “null, void, and no law, nor binding upon 
this State, its officers or citizens.”126  The ordinance further purported 
to make it illegal for any state or federal authority “to enforce the 
payment of duties” under the tariff acts within the state.127  It also 
prohibited any appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court regarding its legal-
ity.  The ordinance specified that a convention of states would be 
convened to ratify it; if other states did not support it, South Carolina 
would have to either repeal the ordinance or secede from the Union.  
 
120 An Act in Alteration of the Several Acts Imposing Duties on Imports, 20 Cong. Ch. 55, 4 
Stat. 270 (May 19, 1828). 
121 An Act to Alter and Amend the Several Acts Imposing Duties on Imports, 22 Cong. Ch. 
227, 4 Stat. 583 (July 14, 1832).  The “substantive provisions” of the 1832 Act never en-
tered into effect due to widespread public opposition.  Bryan T. Camp, A History of Tax 
Regulation Prior to the Administrative Procedure Act, 63 DUKE L.J. 1673, 1687 n.79 (2014). 
122 Powell, supra note 49, at 945. 
123 John C. Calhoun, The South Carolina Exposition and Protest (Dec. 19, 1828), reprinted in 10 
THE PAPERS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 445, 449 (Clyde N. Wilson & W. Edwin Hemphill eds., 
1977). 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 An Ordinance to Nullify Certain Acts of the Congress of the United States, Purporting to 
be Laws, Laying Duties and Imposts on the Importation of Foreign Commodities (Nov. 
24, 1832), reprinted in STATE DOCUMENTS ON FEDERAL RELATIONS, supra note 102, at 169, 
170–71. 
127 Id. at 171. 
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“South Carolina raised over twenty-five thousand volunteer militia-
men to prepare for federal resistance.”128 
No other states joined in South Carolina’s efforts.  To the contra-
ry, several states expressly repudiated them.129  Virginia went so far as 
to enact a resolution stating that the Ordinance was inconsistent with 
its own nullification resolution of 1798.130  Likewise, James Madison 
publicly declared that states lacked the power to nullify federal law.131  
President Jackson proclaimed that nullification was “contradicted ex-
pressly by the letter of the Constitution,” and that South Carolina’s 
acts were treasonous.132 
To resolve the conflict without sacrificing federal supremacy, 
Congress enacted a Force Act, authorizing the use of military force to 
collect the tariff,133 simultaneously with a companion measure sub-
stantially reducing the amount of the tariff.134  In response, the South 
Carolina legislature repealed its Nullification Ordinance,135 but saved 
face by also issuing a new ordinance purporting to nullify the Force 
Act.136  The state nevertheless complied with the tariff, eliminating 
any direct conflict with the federal government.137 
While the theories underlying nullification ultimately led to seces-
sion and helped precipitate the Civil War,138 Northern States also re-
lied on nullification to attempt to avoid enforcing the Fugitive Slave 
 
128 Kight, supra note 20, at 530; see also MCDONALD, supra note 86, at 109 (noting that South 
Carolina’s newly installed governor “advised the people of his state to arm themselves for 
resistance”). 
129 STATE DOCUMENTS ON FEDERAL RELATIONS, supra note 102, at 158–63 (discussing various 
states’ resolutions opposing the Ordinance of Nullification). 
130 Resolves of Virginia (Jan. 26, 1833), reprinted in STATE DOCUMENTS ON FEDERAL 
RELATIONS, supra note 102, at 185, 187. 
131 James Madison, Notes on Nullification, reprinted in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 573, 
573–74, 576–77, 588–93 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910). 
132 President Andrew Jackson, Proclamation (Dec. 10, 1832), reprinted in 2 PAPERS OF THE 
PRESIDENTS, supra note 50, at 640, 643. 
133 An Act Further to Provide for the Collection of Duties on Imports, 22 Cong. Ch. 57, 4 
Stat. 632 (Mar. 2, 1833). 
134 Act of March 2, 1833, 22 Cong. Ch. 55, 4 Stat. 629. 
135 South Carolina’s Final Action (Mar. 18, 1833), reprinted in STATE DOCUMENTS ON FEDERAL 
RELATIONS, supra note 102, at 188, 188. 
136 An Ordinance to Nullify an Act of the Congress of the United States, entitled “An Act 
Further to Provide for the Collection of Duties on Imports,” commonly called the Force 
Bill (Mar. 18, 1833), reprinted in STATE DOCUMENTS ON FEDERAL RELATIONS, supra note 
102, at 188, 188–89. 
137 Hunter, supra note 21, at 679. 
138 See WILLIAM CALEB LORING, NULLIFICATION, SECESSION WEBSTER’S ARGUMENT AND THE 
KENTUCKY AND VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS:  CONSIDERED IN REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION 
AND HISTORICALLY 27 (1893); Mark R. Killenbeck, Bad Company?, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 1, 1 
(2014) (“Nullification was secession’s evil precursor.”). 
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Act,139 which implemented the Constitution’s Fugitive Slave Clause.140  
At the same time as the U.S. Supreme Court was reaffirming the su-
premacy of federal law over contrary state statutes,141 Northern States 
were enacting personal liberty laws attempting to block or interfere 
with slaveholders’ right of recaption under federal law.142  In Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania, Justice Joseph Story wrote for a unanimous Court that 
Pennsylvania’s personal liberty law was unconstitutional because the 
Constitution granted Congress exclusive authority to implement the 
Fugitive Slave Clause.143 
As part of the Compromise of 1850, Congress enacted the Fugitive 
Slave Act of 1850144 which strengthened the original statute and ex-
panded slaveowners’ ability to recover slaves who escaped to the 
North.145  Northern states, in response, continued enacting and en-
forcing personal liberty laws to preclude its enforcement.  Indeed, 
Southern States cited the North’s repeated attempts to nullify federal 
law as part of their justification for seceding.146 
“Wisconsin presented the most notorious example of state inter-
position, for the state’s executive, legislative, and judicial branches 
joined its citizens in strenuous efforts to nullify federal law.”147  In 
perhaps the most extreme example of Wisconsin’s nullification, fed-
eral authorities had enforced the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 by arrest-
ing an abolitionist, Sherman M. Booth, who helped a runaway slave 
escape his former owner.148  A Wisconsin state court, in a ruling af-
 
139 Act of Feb. 12, 1793, 2 Cong. Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302. 
140 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. 
141 See supra notes 73–79 and accompanying text. 
142 THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL:  THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE NORTH 1780–
1861, at 27–29 (1974). 
143 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 625 (1842) (holding that state law “can never be permitted to inter-
fere with or to obstruct the just rights of the owner to reclaim his slave, derived from the 
Constitution of the United States; or with the remedies prescribed by Congress to aid and 
enforce the same”); see also MORRIS, supra note 142, at 102 (noting that the Prigg Court 
held “that states lacked the power to establish procedures for the adjudication of claims 
to runaways”); Paul Finkelman, Sorting Out Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 605, 630 
(1993) (analyzing Prigg). 
144 Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, 31 Cong. Ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (Sept. 18, 1850). 
145 MORRIS, supra note 142, at 146. 
146 Stephen C. Neff, Secession and Breach of Compact:  The Law of Nature Meets the United States 
Constitution, 45 AKRON L. REV. 405, 426–27 (2012). 
147 Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony of American Federalism:  National Sovereignty Versus 
State Sovereignty in Slavery and in Freedom, 45 KAN. L. REV. 1015, 1039 (1997); see also Robert 
J. Kaczorowski, The Supreme Court and Congress’s Power to Enforce Constitutional Rights:  An 
Overlooked Moral Anomaly, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 153, 202 (2004) [hereinafter, Kaczorowski, 
Moral Anomaly] (same). 
148 Kaczorowski, Moral Anomaly, supra note 147, at 202–03; Earl M. Maltz, Slavery, Federalism, 
and the Constitution:  Ableman v. Booth and the Struggle Over Fugitive Slaves, 56 CLEV. ST. L. 
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firmed by the state supreme court, issued a writ of habeas corpus di-
recting those federal officials to free Booth.149  It held that the 1850 
Act was unconstitutional because, among other things, it denied al-
leged slaves the right to trial by jury before being returned to the 
South.150 
The U.S. Marshal released Booth, but re-arrested him again short-
ly thereafter, and Booth was convicted in federal court.151  The Wis-
consin Supreme Court issued another writ ordering his release, reit-
erating its earlier holding that the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was 
unconstitutional.152  In language that recalled both the Virginia and 
Kentucky Resolutions and the South Carolina legislature’s arguments 
during the Nullification Crisis, the state’s highest court held that a 
state has the “solemn duty to interpose [its] authority” when the fed-
eral government seeks to imprison a citizen unconstitutionally.153 
The court elaborated that the Tenth Amendment’s recognition of 
states’ implied powers would be pointless if it did not grant them au-
thority to defend their constitutional prerogatives against federal en-
croachment.154  If the federal government had “sole power” to deter-
mine the constitutionality of its own acts and “enforce its decision 
upon the states,” the Tenth Amendment would be “a mere empty 
sounding announcement, placing the governments of original, in-
herent and reserved powers at the mere forbearance of the federal 
government.”155 
The federal government released Booth, but appealed to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.156  The Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to certify 
the case records to the U.S. Supreme Court on the grounds that the 
Court lacked appellate jurisdiction to review its judgment.157  “By re-
fusing to honor the writ of error, the Wisconsin court essentially as-
serted the authority to nullify section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1793, 
 
REV. 83, 83 (2008) (“Widely-discussed at the time, the case involved not only a successful 
effort by a segment of the Northern populace to prevent the rendition of an escaped 
slave, but also the outright defiance of the federal government by the judiciary of the 
state of Wisconsin.”); see also A. J. Beitzinger, Federal Law Enforcement and the Booth Cases, 
41 MARQ. L. REV. 7, 10–11 (1957). 
149 In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1, 66 (1854). 
150 Id. 
151 Kaczorowski, Moral Anomaly, supra note 147, at 203 (citing United States v. Rycraft, 27 F. 
Cas. 918 (D. Wis. 1824)). 
152 In re Booth and Rycraft, 3 Wis. 157, 189 (1854). 
153 Id. at 194. 
154 Id. at 198. 
155 Id. 
156 Maltz, supra note 148, at 98, 100. 
157 Kaczorowski, Moral Anomaly, supra note 147, at 203; Beitzinger, supra note 148, at 18. 
1304 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:5 
 
which provided for appeals by writ of error.”158  The U.S. Supreme 
Court ordered the state supreme court’s clerk to produce the rec-
ord,159 but he refused to do so.160  The U.S. Supreme Court neverthe-
less considered the case and unanimously overturned the lower 
court’s ruling.161 
The Court began by reaffirming its jurisdiction to entertain ap-
peals from state supreme courts.162  It went on to rule that state courts 
lack power to determine the validity of federal officials’ custody of 
their prisoners,163 and that in any event the 1850 Act was constitution-
al.164  On remand, a divided Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to ac-
cept the U.S. Supreme Court’s mandate,165 but the U.S. Marshal nev-
ertheless re-arrested Booth several months later and incarcerated 
him.166  The conflict finally abated when President James Buchanan 
pardoned Booth on the last day of his term as President.167 
Most nullification episodes following the Civil War involved 
southern states’ “massive resistance” to integration and civil rights for 
African Americans.168  Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown 
v. Board of Education,169 and particularly the Court’s follow-up mandate 
 
158 Maltz, supra note 148, at 101. 
159 United States v. Booth, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 476, 478–79 (1855). 
160 Albeman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 512 (1859) (noting that “no return ha[d] been 
made” in response to the Supreme Court’s order). 
161 Id. at 526. 
162 The Court explained: 
[N]o power is more clearly conferred by the Constitution and laws of the United 
States, than the power of this court to decide, ultimately and finally, all cases aris-
ing under such Constitution and laws; and for that purpose to bring here for revi-
sion, by writ of error, the judgment of a State court, where such questions have 
arisen, and the right claimed under them denied by the highest judicial tribunal 
in the State. 
  Id. at 525. 
163 Id. at 524 (“No State judge or court, after they are judicially informed that the party is 
imprisoned under the authority of the United States, has any right to interfere with him, 
or to require him to be brought before them.”). 
164 Id. at 526 (“[T]he act of Congress commonly called the fugitive slave law is, in all of its 
provisions, fully authorized by the Constitution of the United States.”). 
165 Ableman v. Booth, 11 Wis. 498, 499, 521 (1859); see also Maltz, supra note 148, at 107. 
166 Maltz, supra note 148, at 108–09.  A group of armed men rescued Booth on August 1, 
1860, and he resumed his anti-slavery advocacy.  The U.S. Marshal recaptured him that 
October.  Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Judith A. Hagley, Massive Resistance:  The Rhetoric and Reality, 27 N.M. L. REV. 167, 167 
(1997) (describing “massive resistance” as a “campaign of terror directed against black 
citizens in the South” characterized by “murders, bombings, riots, and racist rhetoric”); 
see generally NUMAN  V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN 
THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950S (1969) (discussing the politics of southern resistance to 
desegregation efforts). 
169 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
May 2015] REVERSE NULLIFICATION 1305 
 
in Brown II that states desegregate their public schools “with all delib-
erate speed,”170 several southern states enacted “Interposition and 
Nullification Resolutions” declaring that Brown was unconstitutional 
and unenforceable within their respective borders.171  Arkansas went 
so far as to enact a state constitutional amendment requiring the leg-
islature to oppose “in every Constitutional manner the Un-
Constitutional desegregation decisions of May 17, 1954 and May 31, 
1955 of the United States Supreme Court.”172 
Notwithstanding that amendment, the Little Rock School Board 
admitted in federal court that its segregated school district was un-
constitutional,173 and adopted a phased desegregation plan, com-
mencing with the 1957 school year, that would take six years to fully 
implement.174  A group of white parents obtained an injunction from 
state court preventing the school district from implementing that de-
segregation plan by admitting black students to Central High 
School.175  The federal district court, however, stayed the state court 
proceedings and prohibited the parents from enforcing their state 
court order.176 
On September 2, 1957, ostensibly seeking to prevent violence, Ar-
kansas Governor Orval Faubus called out the Arkansas National 
Guard to prevent integration of the Little Rock School District as the 
federal court had ordered by barring nine African-American students 
from entering Central High School.177  The federal district court en-
joined Governor Faubus and the Arkansas National Guard from in-
terfering with its previous desegregation order and required them to 
allow the black students to attend Central High School.178  When a lo-
cal mob continued to hinder desegregation efforts, President Dwight 
 
170 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
171 Hunter, supra note 20, at 687 & nn.223–24. 
172 ARK. CONST. amend. 44 (repealed 1990). 
173 Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855, 857–58 (E.D. Ark. 1956), aff’d 243 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 
1957). 
174 Id. at 861. 
175 Keith E. Whittington, The Court as the Final Arbiter of the Constitution:  Cooper v. Aaron 
(1958), reprinted in CREATING CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 9, 12–13 (Gregg Ivers & Kevin T. 
McGuire eds., 2004). 
176 See Thomason v. Cooper, 254 F.2d 808, 808 (8th Cir. 1958) (discussing unreported dis-
trict court order of August 30, 1957, enjoining white parents from using a state court or-
der “as a means for preventing the Little Rock School Board from opening on Septem-
ber 3, 1957, the partially integrated high school in the Little Rock School District in 
accordance with the Board’s plan of integration”). 
177 Whittington, supra note 175, at 12–13. 
178 Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220, 222 (E.D. Ark. 1957), aff’d sub nom. Faubus v. United 
States, 254 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1958). 
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D. Eisenhower mobilized the 101st Airborne Division and federalized 
the Arkansas National Guard to enforce the federal court’s order.179 
In light of the overwhelming local hostility to integration,180 the 
Little Rock School District successfully petitioned the federal district 
court for permission to stay its desegregation order for three years.  
The district court pointed out that “[d]uring the entire [1957–58] 
school year the grounds and interior of Central High School were pa-
trolled first by regular army troops and later by federalized national 
guardsmen.”181  The year had been “marked by repeated incidents of 
more or less serious violence directed against the Negro students and 
their property, by numerous bomb threats directed at the school, by a 
number of nuisance fires started inside the school, by desecration of 
school property, and by the circulation of cards, leaflets and circulars 
designed to intensify opposition to integration.”182  Those events, the 
court concluded, “have had a serious and adverse impact upon the 
students themselves, upon the class-room teachers, upon the adminis-
trative personnel of the school, and upon the overall school pro-
gram.”183  The court concluded that the district had made a good-
faith effort to start desegregating,184 but the serious widespread diffi-
culties in enforcing the order and resulting interference with the ed-
ucational process warranted a “tactical delay” in implementation as a 
matter of equitable discretion.185 
The Eighth Circuit reversed, stating: 
Appalling as the evidence is—the fires, destruction of private and public 
property, physical abuse, bomb threats, intimidation of school officials, 
open defiance of the police department of the City of Little Rock by 
mobs—and the naturally resulting additional expense to the District, dis-
ruption of normal educational procedures, and tension, even nervous 
collapse of the school personnel, we cannot accept the legal conclusions 
drawn by the District Court from these circumstances.186 
It concluded that “the time has not yet come in these United States 
when an order of a Federal Court must be whittled away, watered 
 
179 See Exec. Order No. 10,730, 22 Fed. Reg. 7,628 (Sept. 25, 1957). 
180 Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13, 14 (E.D. Ark. 1958), rev’d 257 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1858), 
aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
181 Id. at 17. 
182 Id. at 20. 
183 Id. at 22. 
184 Id. at 26. 
185 Id. at 28. 
186 Aaron v. Cooper, 257 F.2d 33, 39 (8th Cir. 1958), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 
1 (1958). 
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down, or shamefully withdrawn in the face of violent and unlawful 
acts of individual citizens in opposition thereto.”187 
In Cooper v. Aaron—which has come to be regarded as one of the 
strongest assertions of the federal judiciary’s supremacy over the 
states with regard to constitutional interpretation188—the Supreme 
Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit’s ruling.189  It held that, while the 
local school board may have been attempting to comply with Brown in 
good faith, most of the implementation problems stemmed from the 
refusal of state officials, including the governor and state legislature, 
to cooperate with the district’s integration efforts.190  Black children’s 
constitutional rights, the Court declared, “are not to be sacrificed or 
yielded to the violence and disorder which have followed upon the 
actions of the Governor and Legislature.”191 
The Court went on to respond to earlier public assertions by the 
governor and legislature that Brown did not bind them.  One of the 
“permanent and indispensable feature[s] of our constitutional sys-
tem,” the Court declared, is that “the federal judiciary is supreme in 
the exposition of the law of the Constitution.”192  The Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the Constitution in Brown therefore is “the 
supreme law of the land, and [the Supremacy Clause] makes it of 
binding effect on the States . . . .”193 A Governor therefore lacks “pow-
er to nullify a federal court order.”194 
Apart from desegregation, there have been relatively few attempts 
at nullification in the modern era.  Officials at both the state and fed-
eral levels have repeatedly criticized the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Roe v. Wade,195 and many states have passed laws limiting the ability of 
women to obtain abortions.196  Scholars have argued that Roe played a 
 
187 Id. at 40 (emphasis omitted). 
188 Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First Half-
Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451, 1468 n.45 (1997) (emphasis omitted). 
189 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
190 Id. at 15–16. 
191 Id. at 16. 
192 Id. at 18. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 18–19. 
195 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
196 See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006) (holding 
that exceptions to New Hampshire’s parental notification law were insufficiently broad to 
protect a minor’s access to an immediate abortion when necessary to protect her health); 
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (invalidating partial-birth abortion ban); Voino-
vich v. Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp., 523 U.S. 1036 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari) (discussing lower court’s holding that a state law permitting post-
viability abortions only when necessary to prevent “‘a serious risk of the substantial and ir-
reversible impairment of a major bodily function of the pregnant woman’” was too nar-
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major role in galvanizing abortion opponents and generated a legis-
lative backlash of abortion restrictions.197 
This opposition to Roe, despite its often heated rhetoric, generally 
does not amount to nullification.  While some states and officials in-
sist that Roe was wrongly decided and support the appointment of Jus-
tices who would overturn it or a constitutional amendment to do so, 
they seldom dispute the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to hear the 
case, its power to make its pronouncement, or their concomitant duty 
to follow that pronouncement.  For example, Texas did not continue 
enforcing its abortion statute after Roe invalidated it; indeed, the 
Court was so confident that the state would implement its opinion 
that it did not direct the district court to issue an injunction ordering 
the state to comply.198 
 
row to adequately protect the health of the mother (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2919.17)); Ada v. Guam Soc’y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011 (1992) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (discussing lower court’s ruling that 
Guam’s abortion law, which prohibited “all abortions except in cases of medical emer-
gency,” was facially unconstitutional); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 895–98 (1992) (invalidating spousal notification law); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of 
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (invalidating informed consent re-
quirements, recordkeeping requirements that could have resulted in public disclosure of 
a woman’s decision to have an abortion, and a requirement that a second physician be 
present during abortions of viable fetuses), overruled in part by Casey, 505 U.S. at 881–87; 
Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kan. City, Mo. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 481–82 (1983) (in-
validating law requiring second-trimester abortions to be performed in a hospital); City of 
Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (invalidating hospitalization 
requirements for patients seeking abortions, a parental consent ordinance that lacked ju-
dicial bypass provisions, disclosure requirements, and a 24-hour waiting period), overruled 
in part by Casey, 505 U.S. at 881–87; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (invalidating pa-
rental consent law that lacked exceptions); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (in-
validating statute requiring a physician aborting a fetus that “may be viable” to use the 
method most likely to result in the fetus being born alive); see also Planned Parenthood of 
Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-75 (1976) (invalidating law requiring married 
women to obtain spousal consent for abortions, and minors to obtain parental consent to 
abortions, during the first trimester). 
197 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust:  How Courts Can Support Democracy 
by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1312 (2005) (“Not only did Roe ener-
gize the pro-life movement and accelerate the infusion of sectarian religion into Ameri-
can politics, but it also radicalized many traditionalists.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil 
Rights Fallacies, 79 CAL. L. REV. 751, 766 (1991) (“[T]he decision may well have created 
the Moral Majority, helped defeat the equal rights amendment, and undermined the 
women’s movement by spurring opposition and demobilizing potential adherents.”).  But 
see Neal Devins, How Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Pretty Much) Settled the Abortion Wars, 
118 YALE L.J. 1318, 1323 (2009) (contending that Casey “stabilized abortion politics” be-
cause, “with the notable exception of partial-birth abortion,” legislatures “have typically 
looked to provisions of the Pennsylvania statute upheld in Casey as a template for their 
own legislative enactments”). 
198 Roe, 410 U.S. at 166 (“We find it unnecessary to decide whether the District Court erred 
in withholding injunctive relief, for we assume the Texas prosecutorial authorities will 
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Rather than ignoring Roe and its progeny or unilaterally declaring 
the Court’s holdings to be null and void, conservative states enact an-
ti-abortion laws to the maximum extent the Constitution permits.  
They attempt to find the precise contours of the right to an abortion 
and legislate up to that boundary.  They can achieve this goal only 
through the trial-and-error process of obtaining court rulings on dif-
ferent types of statutory provisions and variations on statutory lan-
guage.199  This legislative probing gives rise to a constitutional dia-
logue between different branches and levels of government;200 it is 
not an attempt to nullify or undermine the Court’s rulings.  Such an 
approach can be burdensome to the women living in those jurisdic-
tions and impose substantial transaction costs, but that is largely a 
function of our precedent-based system of adjudication and Article 
III’s case-or-controversy requirement, which prohibits federal courts 
from issuing advance opinions on hypothetical or potential future 
pieces of legislation.201 
Commentators have debated whether the refusal of many states to 
implement the REAL ID Act202 amounts to nullification.203  Many 
states also have vigorously opposed the Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act (“ACA”),204 but very few of these efforts qualify as 
nullification, either.  North Dakota passed a law declaring that the 
ACA “likely [is] not authorized by the United States Constitution and 
 
give full credence to this decision that the present criminal abortion statutes of that State 
are unconstitutional.”). 
199 See supra note 196. 
200 Cf. Stephen L. Carter, The Morgan “Power” and the Forced Reconsideration of Constitutional 
Decisions, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 819, 824 (1986).  
201 See Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 971 n.3 (1984) 
(“[F]ederal courts have no roving commission to survey the statute books and pass judg-
ments on laws prematurely, and . . . [m]usings regarding the constitutionality of hypo-
thetical statutes . . . are neither wise nor permissible in the courtroom.” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). 
202 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and 
Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 321 (2005). 
203 Compare John Dinan, Contemporary Assertions of State Sovereignty and the Safeguards of Ameri-
can Federalism, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1637, 1639–40 (2010/2011) (contending that states’ oppo-
sition to the REAL ID Act “fall[s] short of invoking the clearly discredited doctrine of nul-
lification”), and Hunter, supra note 20, at 692 (contending that states’ efforts at 
undermining the Real ID Act “are neither nullification nor true interposition, lacking any 
declaration of the Act as unconstitutional”), with Kight, supra note 20, at 534 (discussing 
state opposition to the Real ID Act as part of the “modern nullification movement”), and 
Card, supra note 20, at 1823–24 (stating that “these attempts to nullify Real ID are uncon-
stitutional and without legal foundation”). 
204 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as 
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 
124 Stat. 1029 (2010). 
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may violate its true meaning and intent as given by the founders and 
ratifiers.”205  The statute goes on to specify that no provision of the 
ACA “may interfere with an individual’s choice of a medical or insur-
ance provider except as otherwise provided by the laws of this 
state”206—a direct, and apparently ineffectual, attempt at nullification. 
The citizens of Ohio went even further, amending the Ohio Con-
stitution’s Bill of Rights through a ballot initiative to proclaim that 
“[n]o federal, state, or local law” shall:  compel a person or physician 
to “participate in a health care system,” “prohibit the purchase or sale 
of health care or health insurance,” or “impose a penalty or fine for 
the sale or purchase of health care or health insurance.”207  The pro-
vision specifies that it does not affect any laws in effect as of March 
19, 2010—prior to ACA’s enactment.208 
The marijuana laws of many states also may be considered to be at 
least an implicit form of nullification.  Federal law prohibits the pos-
session and sale of any amount of marijuana for any reason,209 includ-
ing medicinal use,210 except as part of pre-approved FDA research 
studies.  In Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court held that the Com-
merce Clause permits the Government to apply this prohibition even 
to the purely intrastate possession, sale, and use of marijuana.211  Nu-
merous states have nevertheless enacted medical marijuana laws 
which purport to affirmatively permit or license individuals to dis-
pense and use marijuana pursuant to a physician’s order.212 
Colorado and Washington upped the ante still further by permit-
ting the recreational use of marijuana and establishing a permitting 
system for dispensaries.213  While these permits do not purport to ex-
empt users or dealers from federal law, it is nevertheless anomalous 
for a state to officially authorize conduct that federal law prohibits.  
The Obama Administration’s announcement that it will not enforce 
federal drug laws against people acting in compliance with such state 
laws further complicates the analysis.214  Call it “dual nullification”:  
 
205 N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-03-31(1) (2011). 
206 Id. § 54-03-31(3). 
207 OHIO CONST. art. I, § 21(A)–(C). 
208 Id. art. I, § 21(D). 
209 21 U.S.C. §§ 812(b)(1), (c), 841(a)(1), 844(a); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 13–
14 (2005). 
210 United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 491 (2001). 
211 Raich, 545 U.S. at 22 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)). 
212 See David S. Schwartz, High Federalism:  Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power 
to Regulate States, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 567, 575–76 nn.19–24 (2013) (citing statutes). 
213 COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16; WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.4013 (2013). 
214 Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole to All United States Attor-
neys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013), available at 
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the Executive undermines a federal law by refusing to enforce it, and 
states undermine it still further by affirmatively allowing the ostensi-
bly prohibited conduct. 
Among the most blatant modern examples of clear nullification 
are the “Firearms Freedom Acts” that nine states have enacted, which 
proclaim that federal law does not apply to firearms and ammunition 
that are produced and used exclusively within the state.215  Attorney 
General Eric Holder wrote a letter to Governor Sam Brownback of 
Kansas, one of the states that enacted such a statute, declaring it “un-
constitutional” under the Supremacy Clause.216  He informed the 
Governor that federal law enforcement agencies “will continue to ex-
ecute their duties to enforce all federal firearms laws and regula-
tions.”217  And the Ninth Circuit has invalidated Montana’s law.218 
Reverse nullification is easily distinguishable from the patently 
unconstitutional “traditional” nullification that states have attempted 
to implement throughout American history.  Nullification is an at-
tempt to ignore federal law by declaring it unconstitutional.  When 
states enact provisions that mirror federal law, they are attempting to 
assist in its enforcement, to prevent it from being undermined, effec-
tively amended, or temporarily nullified by the Executive. 
II.  THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND REVERSE NULLIFICATION 
The Supremacy Clause provides:  “This Constitution, and the Laws 
of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and 
all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 
 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf (limiting en-
forcement of federal marijuana laws in states that have legalized its use); cf. Memoran-
dum to the United States Attorneys and Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Divi-
sion from Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., Department Policy on Charging Manda-
Mandatory Minimum Sentences and Recidivist Enhancements in Certain Drug Cases 
(Aug. 12, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/
legacy/2014/07/23/ag-memo-department-policypon-charging-mandatory-minimum-
sentences-recidivist-enhancements-in-certain-drugcases.pdf (restricting inclusion of drug 
quantities in indictments to avoid triggering statutory minimum penalties). 
215 Kight, supra note 20, at 551; see also Barak Y. Orbachet, et. al., Arming States’ Rights:  Federal-
ism, Private Lawmakers, and the Battering Ram Strategy, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (2010) 
(“document[ing] the organization of the Firearms Freedom Act movement”). 
216 Letter from Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., to Governor Sam Brownback (Apr. 26, 
2013), available at http://www.propublica.org/documents/item/695506-attorney-general-
holder-letter-to-kans-gov. 
217 Id. 
218 Montana Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, 727 F.3d 975, 982–83 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding 
that, because the Montana Firearms Freedom Act “purports to dictate” that Congress 
lacks power to regulate purely intrastate possession of firearms, “it is necessarily preempt-
ed and invalid”). 
1312 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:5 
 
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”219 This 
provision underlies the Supreme Court’s repeated holdings that 
states must follow federal law and may neither ignore nor nullify it.220  
The Supremacy Clause is the constitutional basis for preemption doc-
trines, which specify the circumstances under which federal law pre-
cludes states from legislating in areas that otherwise fall within their 
authority.  To understand why reverse nullification is constitutionally 
permissible, it is helpful to first review the Supremacy Clause’s devel-
opment. 
The earliest draft of the Supremacy Clause, included in the Vir-
ginia Plan that Edmund Randolph presented at the Constitutional 
Convention, would have granted Congress power “to negative” any 
state laws that it believed to be unconstitutional.221  At Benjamin 
Franklin’s suggestion, the clause was expanded to allow Congress to 
“negative” any state laws that, in its opinion, “contraven[ed]” either 
the Constitution or any U.S. treaties.222  The Convention unanimously 
agreed to the provision as amended.223 
About a week later, Charles Pinckney moved to revise that provi-
sion to allow Congress to “negative all Laws which they shd. [sic] 
Judge to be improper.”224  He explained that such a “universal” veto 
“was in fact the corner stone of an efficient national Govt [sic]” to 
keep the States “in due subordination to the nation.”225  Madison 
concurred, contending that states would have a “constant tendency” 
to infringe on Congress’s prerogatives.226 Allowing Congress to nullify 
state laws was preferable to using force to ensure state compliance 
 
219 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
220 See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (holding the federal Constitution overrules any 
contrary state law); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 517–18 (1858) (“[I]n the 
sphere of action assigned to it, [the federal government] should be supreme, and strong 
enough to execute its own laws by its own tribunals, without interruption from a State or 
from State authorities.”); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 381 (1821) (“The 
general government, though limited as to its objects, is supreme with respect to those ob-
jects . . . [N]one can deny its authority.”); see also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 
515, 571–72 (1832) (M’Lean, J., concurring) (declaring that federal law is supreme); 
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 341 (1816) (same). 
221 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 
1966) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS]. 
222 Id. at 54 (Madison’s Journal) (May 31, 1787). 
223 Id. 
224 Id. at 164 (Madison’s Journal) (June 8, 1787) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
225 Id. (Madison’s Journal) (statement of Pinckney); accord  id. at 169 (Yates’ Journal) (state-
ment of Pinckney). 
226 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 221, at 164 (Madison’s Journal) (statement of Madi-
son). 
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with its will.227  And granting Congress broad discretion to decide for 
itself when to nullify state law would prevent disputes over whether a 
particular state statute actually was unconstitutional or violated a trea-
ty.228  Picking up on that thread, Wilson elaborated that “[a] defini-
tion of the cases in which the Negative should be exercised, is im-
practicable.”229  Since discretion had to be “left on one side or the 
other,” it would be “most safely lodged on the side of the Natl. Govt 
[sic].”230  Another delegate concurred that it was “impossible to draw 
a line between the cases proper & improper for the exercise of the 
negative,” and there was a greater chance of states enacting harmful 
legislation than of Congress abusing its authority to set aside state 
law.231 
Other delegates, such as Elbridge Gerry, were concerned that 
such a broad power would be abused, and believed the proposed 
“negative” should be limited only to certain types of state laws, such as 
those authorizing paper money.232  It was feared that large states, 
which would control Congress, would use this power to “crush the 
small ones.”233  Pinckkney’s motion to expand Congress’s discretion 
to “negative” state laws failed by a vote of three to seven, with one 
state divided.234  Thus, the Virginia Plan would have given Congress 
power “to negative all laws passed by the several States contravening 
in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of Union, or 
any treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union.”235 
After Randolph finished presenting the Virginia Plan, William 
Paterson offered the New Jersey Plan, which provided greater protec-
tion for smaller states.  Whereas the Virginia Plan allowed Congress 
to override state laws, the New Jersey Plan’s version of the Supremacy 
Clause more closely resembled the one that was ultimately adopted.  
It provided that all acts of Congress made in pursuance of its consti-
 
227 Id. at 164–65 (Madison’s Journal) (statement of Madison); accord  id. at 169 (Yates’ Jour-
nal) (statement of Madison). 
228 Id. at 165 (Madison’s Journal) (statement of Madison). 
229 Id. at 166 (Madison’s Journal) (statement of Wilson). 
230 Id. 
231 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 221, at 167 (Madison’s Journal) (statement of Dickin-
son). 
232 Id. (statement of Gerry); see also id. at 165–66 (Madison’s Journal) (statement of Sher-
man) (agreeing that “the cases in which the negative ought to be exercised, might be de-
fined”);  id. at 169 (Yates’ Journal) (statement of Williamson) (“The national legislature 
ought to possess the power of negativing such laws only as will encroach on the national 
government.”). 
233 Id. at 167 (Madison’s Journal) (statement of Bedford). 
234 Id. at 168 (Madison’s Journal). 
235 Id. at 236 (June 13, 1787) (Madison’s Journal). 
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tutional powers, as well as all treaties, “shall be the supreme law of the 
respective States so far as those Acts or Treaties shall relate to the said 
States or their Citizens,” and that state judges “shall be bound thereby 
in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the Individual 
States to the contrary notwithstanding . . . .”236 His proposal further 
specified that if “any State, or any body of men in any State shall op-
pose or prevent ye. [sic] carrying into execution such acts or treaties,” 
the Executive could use military force “to enforce and compel an 
obedience.”237  While the Virginia Plan would have allowed Congress 
to excuse “a negative on the law of the States,”238 Paterson’s New Jer-
sey Plan empowered the Executive to forcibly compel states’ obedi-
ence to federal law.239 
Madison “declare[d] himself unfriendly to both plans,”240 and 
proposed his own alternative.241  His compromise provided: 
All laws of the particular States contrary to the Constitution or laws of the 
United States to be utterly void; and the better to prevent such laws being 
passed, the Governour or president of each state shall be appointed by 
the General Government and shall have a negative upon the laws about 
to be passed in the State of which he is Governour or President.242 
Madison explained that Paterson’s plan would leave states at liber-
ty “to execute their unrighteous projects agst. [sic] each other” be-
cause it did not grant Congress a negative over state laws.243  The 
Convention voted to proceed with Randolph’s plan rather than Pat-
erson’s plan.244 Luther Martin cautioned, however, that small states 
“would never allow a negative to be exercised over their laws.”245 
Approximately one week later, the Convention reviewed each 
component of Randolph’s plan.  Upon returning to the Supremacy 
Clause, Gouverneur Morris argued that allowing Congress to negative 
state laws was unnecessary and “likely to be terrible to the States.”246  
Congress did not need such a power, he argued, because “[a] law that 
 
236 Id. at 245 (Madison’s Journal) (June 15, 1787) (proposal of Paterson). 
237 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 221, at 245. 
238 Id. at 252 (Madison’s Journal) (June 16, 1787) (statement of Wilson). 
239 Id. at 252; accord id. at 260 (Yates’ Journal) (June 16, 1787) (statement of Wilson). 
240 Id. at 283 (Madison’s Journal) (June 18, 1787) (statement of Madison). 
241 Id. at 291 (Madison’s Journal) (June 18, 1787) (statement of Madison). 
242 Id. at 293 (Madison’s Journal) (June 18, 1787) (proposal of Madison). 
243 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 221, at 318 (Madison’s Journal) (June 18, 1787) 
(statement of Madison). 
244 Id. at 313 (Convention Journal) (June 19, 1787); accord id. at 322 (Madison’s Journal) 
(June 19, 1787). 
245 Id. at 438 (Madison’s Journal) (June 27, 1787) (statement of L. Martin). 
246 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 221, at 27 (Madison’s Journal) (July 17, 1787) (state-
ment of Morris). 
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ought to be negatived will be set aside in the Judiciary departmt. [sic] 
and if that security should fail; may be repealed by a Nationl. [sic] 
law.”247  Roger Sherman agreed, claiming that “the Courts of the 
States would not consider as valid any law contravening the Authority 
of the Union.”248  Madison insisted that a negative was necessary to 
check the states’ “propensity” to “pursue their particular interests in 
opposition to the general interests,”249  but was overruled.  The con-
vention voted three to seven to eliminate Congress’ power to “nega-
tive” state laws.250 
The Convention then approved Luther Martin’s motion to re-
place that clause with a modified version of Paterson’s proposal: 
[T]he Legislative acts of the U.S. made by virtue & in pursuance of the 
articles of Union, and all treaties made & ratified under the authority of 
the U.S. shall be the supreme law of the respective States, as far as those 
acts or treaties shall relate to the said States, or their Citizens and inhab-
itants  & that the Judiciaries of the several States shall be bound there-
by in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the individual 
States to the contrary notwithstanding.251 
This language was submitted to the Committee on Detail in late 
July.252  The Committee made some stylistic tweaks,253 and the Con-
vention as a whole further modified the provision to specify that the 
Constitution itself, as well as federal laws and treaties, constitutes part 
of the supreme law of the land.254  The proposal was then submitted 
to the Committee on Style, which reported the final version of the 
Clause: 
This constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made 
in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, un-
 
247 Id. at 28 (Madison’s Journal) (July 17, 1787) (statement of Morris). 
248 Id. at 27 (Madison’s Journal) (July 17, 1787) (statement of Sherman); see also id. (state-
ment of L. Martin). 
249 Id. (statement of Madison). 
250 Id. at 28 (Madison’s Journal) (July 17, 1787). 
251 Id. at 28–29 (Madison’s Journal) (July 17, 1787) (proposal of L. Martin). 
252 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 221, at 132. 
253 On August 6, the Committee on Detail reported the following version of the clause: 
The Acts of the Legislature of the United States made in pursuance of this Consti-
tution, and all Treaties made under the authority of the United States shall be the 
supreme law of the several States, and of their citizens and inhabitants; and the 
judges in the several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions anything in 
the Constitutions or laws of the several States to the contrary notwithstanding. 
  Id. at 183 (Aug. 6, 1781) (Madison’s Journal). 
254 As modified, the language in the first half of the clause read:  “This Constitution & the 
Laws of the [United States] made in pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made under the 
authority of the [United States]. . . .” Id. at 389.  Madison successfully moved to have the 
reference to treaties expanded to read, “all Treaties made or which shall be made.”  Id. at 
409 (Madison’s Journal) (Aug. 25, 1787); see also id. at 572 (reprinting the proposal con-
taining these provisions, as submitted to the Committee on Style). 
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der the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the 
land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in 
the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.255 
In late August, Pinckney moved to supplement the Supremacy 
Clause by granting Congress broad authority, by a two-thirds vote of 
each house, to “negative” any state laws that “interfer[ed] in the opin-
ion of the Legislature with the General interests and harmony of the 
Union.”256  Wilson concurred that it would be better to let Congress 
nullify objectionable state laws before they went into effect, rather 
than relying on judges to void them afterwards.257 
Sherman objected that the proposal was “unnecessary” because 
the Supremacy Clause rendered “the laws of the General Govern-
ment . . . Supreme & paramount to the State laws . . . .”258 Another 
delegate objected that no state would “ever agree to be bound hand 
& foot in this manner.”259  The convention narrowly defeated the 
proposal by a vote of five to six.260 
The history of the Supremacy Clause reveals an important fact to 
consider in determining both the legitimacy of the Court’s current 
preemption doctrine as well as the constitutionality of reverse nullifi-
cation.  The Clause, as adopted, declares that state laws which violate 
the Constitution, federal law, or treaties are void and unenforcea-
ble.261  Charles Pinckney moved on two different occasions to grant 
the government even wider preemptive powers, allowing Congress to 
“negative” any state laws it “judge[s] to be improper,” 262 or that would 
“interfer[e] . . . with the General interests and harmony of the Un-
ion.”263  The Convention rejected both proposals.264  This history 
counsels against a broad interpretation of the Supremacy Clause that 
would allow state laws to be nullified on the grounds they are incon-
sistent with broad national interests or objectives.  Rather, the Fram-
ers carefully tailored the Supremacy Clause to allow state laws to be 
voided only if they actually conflict with federal law itself.  Nothing in 
the legislative history suggests that state laws may be set aside to pro-
mote an executive policy of under- or non-enforcement of federal 
 
255 Id. at 603. 
256 Id. at 390 (Madison’s Journal) (Aug. 23, 1787) (statement of Pinckney). 
257 Id. at 391 (statement of Wilson). 
258 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 221, at 390 (statement of Sherman). 
259 Id. at 391 (statement of Rutledge). 
260 Id. 
261 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
262 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 221, at 164 (Madison’s Journal) (June 8, 1787). 
263 2 id. at 390 (Madison’s Journal) (Aug. 23, 1787) (statement of Pinckney). 
264 1 id. at 168 (Madison’s Journal) (June 8, 1787);  2 id. at 390 (Madison’s Journal) (Aug. 
23, 1787). 
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law.  Reverse nullification is consistent with the Supremacy Clause’s 
plain text, legislative history, and underlying purposes. 
III.  PREEMPTION AND REVERSE NULLIFICATION 
The Supreme Court recognizes four main types of preemption:  
express preemption, conflict preemption, obstacle preemption, and 
field preemption.265  Express preemption, which occurs when Con-
gress explicitly prohibits states from legislating within a particular 
“domain,” precludes reverse nullification.266  Congress should tailor 
express preemption clauses in statutes to allow states to enact and en-
force their own parallel restrictions that mirror those set forth in fed-
eral law.267  Allowing for such reverse nullification would help amelio-
rate the effects of executive under- and non-enforcement of federal 
law. 
Conflict preemption, by definition, does not arise when states en-
gage in reverse nullification.  With reverse nullification, states enact 
provisions that mirror, rather than conflict with, federal require-
ments.  Obstacle and field preemption, in contrast, are direct imped-
iments to reverse nullification; the Court should either abandon 
those doctrines, to conform its preemption jurisprudence more close-
ly to the original intent underlying the Supremacy Clause,268 or modi-
fy them to permit reverse nullification. 
A.  Express Preemption 
Express preemption occurs when Congress includes a provision in 
a federal law that prohibits states from enacting certain types of stat-
utes.  For example, the Federal Aviation Administration Authoriza-
 
265 Congress also may preempt state law under the Elections Clause.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, 
cl. 1.  That provision permits state legislatures to regulate the time, place, and manner of 
federal elections, but specifies that “Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such 
Regulations.”  Id.  The Supreme Court has recognized that this provision grants Congress 
authority to displace state law independent of the Supremacy Clause.  Arizona v. Inter 
Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2256–57 (2013); see also Ex parte Siebold, 100 
U.S. 371, 384 (1879) (holding that “the power of Congress” over federal elections “is par-
amount,” and that federal election laws “necessarily supersede[]” contrary state laws).  
The Court explained that, when Congress exercises its power under the Elections Clause, 
a presumption against preemption does not apply (as it would under the Supremacy 
Clause), because the exercise of Elections Clause authority “necessarily displaces some el-
ement of a pre-existing legal regime erected by the States.”  Inter Tribal Council, 133 S. Ct. 
at 2257 (emphasis omitted). 
266 Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992). 
267 See infra notes 274–77 and accompanying text. 
268 See supra notes 261–64 and accompanying text. 
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tion Act provides, “‘[A] State [or local government] may not enact or 
enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and ef-
fect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carri-
er . . . with respect to the transportation of property.’”269  Likewise, 
the United States Warehouse Act stated, “[T]he power, jurisdiction, 
and authority conferred upon the Secretary of Agriculture under this 
Act” with regard to warehouses and warehousemen “shall be exclusive 
with respect to all persons securing a license hereunder so long as 
said license remains in effect.”270  Such an exclusive grant of authority 
necessarily excluded states from regulating warehouses. 
If Congress chooses to bar states from legislating in a particular 
area, then reverse nullification is impermissible.  As a policy matter, 
for the reasons discussed throughout this Part, Congress generally 
should craft express preemption provisions to allow for reverse nulli-
fication.  Rather than specifying that all state laws concerning particu-
lar matters are preempted, statutes should specify instead that any 
laws other than those which simply restate federal requirements or 
prohibitions are preempted.  For example, the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) provides that a state “shall 
not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or 
packaging” of “any federally registered pesticide or device” that is “in 
addition to or different from those required under this subchap-
ter.”271  The Supreme Court held that “a state-law labeling require-
ment is not pre-empted by [this language] if it is equivalent to, and 
fully consistent with, FIFRA’s misbranding provisions.”272  Thus, 
FIFRA allows states to impose and enforce standards mirroring those 
set forth in federal law, thereby authorizing an alternate enforcement 
mechanism for them. 
Likewise, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 pro-
vides that no state or political subdivision may “establish or continue 
in effect . . . any requirement which is different from, or in addition 
 
269 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (2012) (quoted in Am. Trucking Ass’n v. City of Los Angeles, 133 
S. Ct. 2906, 2100–02 (2013) (holding that § 14501(c)(1) expressly preempts contrary 
state laws and other state-imposed restrictions with the force of law)); see also 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1334(b) (2012) (“No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be 
imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes 
the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter.”) 
(quoted in Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 515, 521–22 (holding that § 1334(b) expressly preempts 
state common law claims based on cigarette advertisements)). 
270 Act of Mar. 2, 1931, 71 Cong. Ch. 366, § 29, 46 Stat. 1463, 1465 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoted in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 224 (1947)). 
271 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”), 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a)–
(b)(2012). 
272 Bates v. Dow Agrosciences L.L.C., 544 U.S. 431, 447 (2005). 
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to, any requirement applicable under this chapter” for a “device in-
tended for human use . . . which relates to [its] safety or effective-
ness.”273  The Court held that this provision allows states to maintain 
their own manufacturing and labeling requirements for pacemakers 
so long as they mirror FDA regulations.274 
Such reasonably limited express preemption provisions allow 
states to engage in reverse nullification by crafting and enforcing 
mandates that parallel those set forth in federal law, to help amelio-
rate the impact of under- or non-enforcement by the federal Execu-
tive.  Robert Schapiro’s work on interactive federalism points out that 
states can act as a “fail-safe mechanism”—an “additional source of 
protection” for the interests a federal statute is enacted to promote—
if the federal government “fails to enforce regulations that facially 
apply.”275  Allowing state officials to enforce parallel legal restrictions 
can help offset the ubiquitous resource constraints to which nearly all 
government agencies are subject.276 
Amanda M. Rose emphasizes that supplemental state enforcement 
can be especially useful when under-enforcement occurs because an 
agency responsible for enforcing a federal law has been “captured” by 
the very interests or group the statute was enacted to regulate.277  She 
explains: 
Because they are accountable to a different set of constituencies, it may 
prove harder for regulated parties to capture state enforcers than a fed-
eral enforcer. Capture will also be harderor at least more expen-
sivesimply because in a concurrent enforcement regime there are 
more enforcers that must be captured to ensure the desired level of un-
der-enforcement.278 
At the very least, if a law is worth enacting, Congress should in-
dulge a strong presumption in favor of embedding a backstop to pro-
tect against the possibility that future administrations will decline, or 
be unable, to adequately enforce it. 
 
273 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2012). 
274 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495 (1996). 
275 Schapiro, supra note 21, at 243, 290; see also Lemos, supra note 21, at 748–49 (“Enforce-
ment authority creates a state-level check against underenforcement by federal agen-
cies . . . . States can increase enforcement, thereby reducing the risk of discriminatory 
nonenforcement and underdeterrence.”). 
276 Lemos, supra note 21, at 702–03; Rose, supra note 21, at 1345. 
277 Rose, supra note 21, at 1345, 1357; see also Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies:  Avoiding 
Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 56–57 (2010). 
278 Rose, supra note 21, at 1357. 
1320 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:5 
 
B.  Conflict Preemption 
Conflict preemption occurs when “it is impossible for a private 
party to comply with both state and federal requirements.”279  In one 
recent case, for example, the Court held that state law was preempted 
because it was impossible for the manufacturer of a generic pharma-
ceutical “to comply with both its federal-law duty to not alter [the 
drug’s] label and its state law duty to . . . strengthen the warnings on 
[the drug’s] label.”280  Reverse nullification does not raise concerns 
about conflict preemption because, by definition, it involves a state 
attempt to enforce the same requirements as those set forth in feder-
al law. 
C.  Obstacle Preemption 
Obstacle preemption is one of the biggest impediments to reverse 
nullification.  As its name suggests, obstacle preemption arises when a 
state law would “stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” in enact-
ing the federal law.281  Some aspects of obstacle preemption may bet-
ter be classified as “conflict” preemption.  For example, the Court has 
held that obstacle preemption applies where federal law affirmatively 
authorizes or permits conduct under certain circumstances (i.e., the 
law goes beyond merely refraining from prohibiting the conduct), yet 
state law purports to either prohibit it or impose additional require-
ments.282  In such a case, the state law conflicts with the federal stat-
 
279 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990). 
280 Mut. Pharm. Co., Inc. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2469 (2013). 
281 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
282 See, e.g., Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996) (“[T]he 
Federal Statute authorizes national banks to engage in activities that the State Statute ex-
pressly forbids.  Thus, the State’s prohibition of those activities would seem to stand as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment of one of the Federal Statute’s purposes.” (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)); Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 495 (1987) (holding 
that the Clean Water Act preempts state common law suits for pollution because such 
suits “would compel the [point] source [of the pollution] to adopt different control 
standards and a different compliance schedule from those approved by the EPA”); Frank-
lin Nat’l Bank of Franklin Square v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 375–79 (1954) (holding that 
a New York law prohibiting banks from using the word “saving” or “savings” was invalid 
because it conflicted with federal law authorizing national banks to receive savings depos-
its); see also Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 380 (2000) (invalidating 
state laws that prohibited a wider range of trade with Burma than did federal sanctions, 
because “[s]anctions are drawn not only to bar what they prohibit but to allow what they 
permit, and the inconsistency of sanctions here undermines the congressional calibration 
of force”). 
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ute,283 even though it is not impossible to comply with both provi-
sions.284 
Obstacle preemption also goes further, however, barring state laws 
that may frustrate Congress’s purpose in enacting a statute or the 
goals it sought to achieve.285  The Supremacy Clause provides that the 
Constitution, federal laws, and treaties are the “supreme Law of the 
Land, . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.”286  Federal statutes themselves indisputa-
bly may preempt state laws, but the Supremacy Clause does not pro-
vide much of a basis for contending that the purposes or goals under-
lying those laws should be accorded similar preemptive effect.  As 
Caleb Nelson explained in his seminal article on this topic, “[u]nder 
the Supremacy Clause, preemption occurs if and only if state law con-
tradicts a valid rule established by federal law, and the mere fact that 
federal law serves certain purposes does not automatically mean that 
it contradicts everything that might get in the way of those purpos-
es.”287 
By way of comparison, the Constitution specifies the purposes for 
which it was enacted, including “establish[ing] justice” and 
“promot[ing] the general welfare.”288  Even though the Framers ex-
pressly agreed upon these objectives, they do not license federal 
courts to invalidate any state laws that purportedly conflict with those 
broad goals.  Indeed, it does not appear that any court has ever relied 
on the Constitution’s Preamble or other expressions of the Framers’ 
objectives as a basis for preempting state law.  And the Framers twice 
rejected Charles Pinckney’s proposals to grant Congress broad au-
thority to invalidate state laws that Congress believed frustrated na-
tional goals.289  The Supremacy Clause does not afford courts greater 
authority to preempt state laws to promote the goals underlying fed-
eral statutes than to further the objectives underlying the Constitu-
tion itself. 
 
283 See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 590 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (holding that a 
state law is preempted when it prohibits, restricts, or burdens conduct in which federal 
law “goves an actor a right to engage”). 
284 See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., 373 U.S. at 142–43 (“A holding of federal exclu-
sion of state law is inescapable and requires no inquiry into congressional design where 
compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility.”). 
285 Hines, 312 U.S. at 67; see also Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1950 (2013) (determin-
ing “whether a state law conflicts with Congress’ purposes and objectives”). 
286 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
287 Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 231–32 (2000). 
288 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
289 See supra notes 263–64 and accompanying text. 
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A court would maintain that, as a formal matter, it is the federal 
statute that preempts state law, rather than Congress’s unenacted 
purposes or objectives.  Such an argument is untenable with regard 
to obstacle preemption because a court must retreat to that doctrine 
only if express and conflict preemption (broadly understood, as ex-
plained above) have failed.  Even if obstacle preemption reflects 
Congress’s actual or hypothesized preferences, it is a stretch to deem 
such preemption either an interpretation or implementation of the 
statute itself.290  Obstacle preemption thus stands in tension with the 
Supremacy Clause.291  It likewise stands in contrast with the Article I, 
§ 7 legislative process, which affords legal effect only to provisions 
that have been enacted by both chambers of Congress and presented 
to the President.292 
The Court’s ruling in Arizona v. United States demonstrates the ex-
traordinary breadth of obstacle preemption.  The Immigration Re-
form and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”) makes it a crime “for em-
ployers to knowingly hire, recruit, refer, or continue to employ 
unauthorized workers,”293 but only a civil offense for undocumented 
aliens to “seek or engage in unauthorized work.”294  Section 5(C) of 
Arizona’s S.B. 1070 made it a misdemeanor for undocumented aliens 
to knowingly work or seek work in the state.295  The Court held that 
enforcement of this statute would pose an “obstacle” to IRCA’s goals, 
since Congress had opted against imposing criminal sanctions on 
undocumented employees.296 
Since IRCA prohibits undocumented aliens from attempting to 
work in the United States, and even imposes civil penalties on those 
 
290 But see John David Ohlendorf, Textualism and Obstacle Preemption, 47 GA. L. REV. 369, 442 
(arguing that “obstacle preemption is justifiable as a form of negative inference from the 
statutory text”). 
291 See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 585–90 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that 
the Court’s obstacle preemption doctrine is a misinterpretation of the Supremacy 
Clause); see also Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131, 1142 (2011) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (concluding that obstacle preemption is “wholly illegitimate”); 
Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 767 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (contending that 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not preempt a state law governing procedure in state courts that 
burdens plaintiffs’ ability to pursue § 1983 claims). 
292 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (“[T]he prescription 
for legislative action in Art. I, §§ 1, 7, represents the Framers’ decision that the legislative 
power of the Federal Government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought 
and exhaustively considered, procedure.”). 
293 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2505 (2012) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A), 
(a)(2)). 
294 Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(1)(C)(i), 1255(c)(2)). 
295 Id. at 2503 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2928(C) (West Supp. 2011)). 
296 Id. at 2504. 
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who did so, it is difficult to understand how Arizona’s parallel enact-
ment undermined federal law.  The Court explained that federal law 
“reflects a considered judgment that making criminals out of aliens 
engaged in unauthorized work—aliens who already face the possibil-
ity of employer exploitation because of their removable status—
would be inconsistent with federal policy and objectives.”297  This rea-
soning conflates federal law—which is the supreme law of the land—
with the motives of some (or perhaps even most) of the members of 
Congress who voted for IRCA. 
IRCA refrains from imposing criminal penalties on undocument-
ed aliens who work illegally.  The Arizona Court, however, treated 
IRCA as if it affirmatively provided that such individuals may not be 
subject to criminal penalties at the federal, state, or local levels.  Con-
gress’ refusal to impose federal criminal penalties does not constitute 
a statutory policy against the imposition of such penalties by other au-
thorities.  The fact that the possibility of criminal penalties was con-
sidered and rejected during one of the many steps in the legislative 
process298 does not mean that Congress affirmatively adopted a policy 
of protecting “aliens who seek or engage in unauthorized employ-
ment” from being subject to such consequences.299  Congress’s deci-
sion to omit criminal penalties for undocumented aliens who work 
illegally means only that Congress declined to impose such penalties, 
not that Congress acted, or even intended, to prohibit them. 
Indeed, Congress’s decision to exclude such penalties from IRCA 
does not even suggest that a majority of members in each House op-
posed the idea.  William Eskridge cogently explains: 
[F]ederal legislation can be blocked not only by majorities in either the 
House or the Senate, but also by individual committee chairs in either 
chamber, by the Rules Committee in the House, by filibustering minori-
ties in the Senate, by House-Senate conference committees, by negative 
votes of either chamber for the conference substitute, and of course by 
the President.300 
Furthermore, had a member suggested a provision to expressly 
protect undocumented workers from criminal prosecution at the 
state level (as the Court’s ruling in Arizona does), there is a substan-
tial likelihood it would not have gotten through the legislative pro-
 
297 Id. 
298 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2504 (“Proposals to make unauthorized work a criminal offense were 
debated and discussed during the long process of drafting IRCA.  But Congress rejected 
them.” (internal citations omitted)). 
299 Id. 
300 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 
1448 (2008). 
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cess, either.  While the Court claims it is simply enforcing a legislative 
compromise,301 in reality it has granted a windfall to one side.302  Thus, 
should the Court choose to retain its doctrine of obstacle preemp-
tion, it should at least recognize an exception for reverse nullifica-
tion.303 
It might be objected that a state law can pose an obstacle to the 
goals underlying an analogous federal statute because state officials 
may interpret it differently or pursue different enforcement priorities 
than their federal counterparts.304  Requiring regulated entities to 
deal with two or more different sets of regulators, even if they are en-
forcing identically worded provisions, also can be costly and incon-
venient and unduly interfere with their operations.305  Moreover, 
many regulated entities may find it prudent to comply with a state’s 
expectations or interpretations, even if they are more stringent than 
those of the federal government, thereby undermining the legislative 
balance embodied in the federal statute.306 
The weight of these objections will vary dramatically with the na-
ture and specificity of the federal statute at issue.  In Arizona, for ex-
ample, there was no serious argument that federal and state officials 
were interpreting the applicable statutes differently, in the sense that 
they disagreed about whether certain conduct was illegal.  If the text 
of other federal statutes gives insufficiently determinate guidance as 
to the legality of particular acts, Congress could authorize agencies to 
 
301 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2504.  The Court recognized that federal law gives federal officials 
discretion over whether to arrest removable aliens.  Id. at 2505–06.  The Court held that 
allowing state officers to arrest removable aliens interferes with the Executive’s discretion 
to refrain from removing them.  Id. at 2506 (expressing concern about “unnecessary har-
assment of some aliens . . . whom federal officials determine should not be removed,” 
even though they have broken the law and are in the country illegally).  Thus, it conclud-
ed that “§ 6 creates an obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”  Id. at 
2507. 
302 The Court also invalidated § 6 of S.B. 1070, which permitted state officers to arrest people 
whom they had probable cause to believe had “committed any public offense that makes 
[them] removable from the United States.”  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2505 (quoting ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. § 13-3883(A)(5) (West Supp. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
303 Schapiro, supra note 21, at 1295 (arguing that courts should be less willing to apply obsta-
cle preemption to state laws that parallel federal restrictions, due to the benefits of con-
current state enforcement of those restrictions); Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 20, 
at 1303 (“[U]ncooperative federalism underscores the value of state statutes and regula-
tions that occupy the same terrain as federal law.”). 
304 Lemos, supra note 21, at 701; Rose, supra note 21, at 1353. 
305 Rose, supra note 21, at 1352. 
306 Lemos, supra note 21, at 753. 
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enact preemptive legislative regulations, which would be binding on 
states, to implement and definitively construe those laws.307 
Agencies concerned with states’ interpretations of federal statuto-
ry standards should be required to clarify them through congression-
ally authorized legislative regulations, rather than being permitted to 
rely on obstacle preemption.  Such regulations would bear the legit-
imacy of statutory authorization, and generally would be promulgated 
subject to the procedural protections of the formal notice-and-
comment rulemaking process.308  When first issued, they also would 
be subject to legislative invalidation under the Congressional Review 
Act.309 
Perhaps most importantly, such a regulation must be consistent 
with, and a reasonable interpretation of, the text of the statute it is 
purportedly implementing or interpreting.310  Administrative under- 
and non-enforcement policies, in contrast, do not enjoy congression-
al sanction and typically are inconsistent with the plain text of the 
statute (since, by definition, the Executive refrains from applying a 
statute to situations to which it admittedly extends).  Thus, requiring 
states with statutes that parallel federal laws to act consistently with 
congressionally authorized federal regulations implementing or con-
struing those laws leaves room for those states to supplement insuffi-
cient federal enforcement efforts.  And even in the absence of such 
implementing regulations, state enforcement efforts still will be “nec-
essarily cabin[ed]” by the language of the federal law the state mir-
rored.311 
Allowing states to become involved in enforcing federal re-
strictions also may sometimes be seen as undesirable because state of-
ficials act primarily to promote the interests of constituencies within 
their respective states, while federal officials presumably are con-
 
307 See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 576 (2009) (“[A]n agency regulation with the force of 
law can pre-empt conflicting state requirements.”); see, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor 
Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (holding that the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 
preempted plaintiff’s tort law claim). 
308 See 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
309 See id. §§ 801–08.  Congress has successfully nullified federal regulations under the Act, 
however, on only one occasion:  ergonomic regulations from the Occupational Health 
and Safety Administration that would have protected workers from repetitive strain disor-
ders.  Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport:  Policy Erosion in a Highly Par-
tisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671, 1717 (2012) (citing Joint Resolution of Mar. 20, 2001, Pub. 
L. No. 107-5, 115 Stat. 7). 
310 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984). 
311 Lemos, supra note 21, at 757. 
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cerned with broader national interests.312  State officials also have a 
substantial incentive to focus their enforcement efforts on out-of-state 
targets.313  Such practical concerns are not a basis for preempting a 
state law, however, since they do not give rise to conflicts between 
federal and state law.  Even as a policy matter, these concerns are not 
persuasive reasons for Congress or courts to bar states from engaging 
in reverse nullification.  State officials’ willingness and incentive to 
enforce legal restrictions against entities other than those whom fed-
eral officials would target is one of the primary justifications for re-
verse nullification. State enforcement supplements federal enforce-
ment, filling gaps that federal officials leave as a matter of policy, cost-
benefit analysis, or resource constraints. 
 Finally, it may be objected that modifying obstacle preemption 
doctrine to facilitate reverse nullification would interfere with the 
President’s Article II power to execute the law.314  The Court has held, 
however, that Article II does not prohibit “voluntary state participa-
tion” in the administration or enforcement of federal law.315  States 
regularly enact laws that mirror federal law,316 and are sometimes 
even empowered to directly enforce federal laws themselves.317  Modi-
fying preemption doctrine to facilitate states’ reverse nullification of 
federal law therefore would not raise colorable Article II concerns. 
D.  Field Preemption 
The final type of preemption the Supreme Court recognizes is 
field preemption.  A federal statute precludes state laws in an area 
due to field preemption “when the scope of [the federal] statute in-
dicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy a field exclusive-
ly.”318  Field preemption will be inferred when Congress enacts a 
“scheme of federal regulation . . . so pervasive as to make reasonable 
 
312 Id. at 753. 
313 Id. at 753; Rose, supra note 21, at 1361. 
314 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (Vesting Clause); id. art. II, § 3. 
315 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 n.12 (1997). 
316 See supra notes 13, 21 and accompanying text; Cox, supra note 23, at 31; Robert B. 
Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 870–73 (2006); see, e.g., supra notes 
271–74 and accompanying text. 
317 Amy Widman & Prentiss Cox, State Attorneys General’s Use of Concurrent Public Enforcement 
Authority in Federal Consumer Protection Laws, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 53, 55 (2011) (noting 
that approximately two dozen federal laws authorize direct enforcement by states). 
318 Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995) (quoted in Altria Group, Inc. v. 
Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76–77 (2008)); see, e.g., Napier v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 
605, 611 (1926) (holding that the Locomotive Inspection Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20701 et seq., 
“manifest[s] the intention to occupy the entire field of regulating locomotive equip-
ment”). 
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the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement 
it.”319  For example, the Court has held that “the pervasive nature of 
the scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise . . . leads us to con-
clude that there is pre-emption.”320 
Textualist Justices on the Supreme Court have come to recognize 
field preemption as “suspect . . . in the absence of a congressional 
command that a particular field be pre-empted.”321  A strong argu-
ment can be made that field preemption is an unnecessary doctrine 
that the Court should abandon.  If Congress wishes to preempt state 
laws in a particular area, it may do so expressly.322  In recent years, the 
Court has moved toward requiring express “clear statements” from 
Congress for various purposes, including creating a private right of 
action,323 overcoming the presumption against extraterritoriality,324 
and waiving state sovereign immunity.325  The same concerns about 
federalism and state sovereignty that motivated the Court to require a 
clear statement from Congress in order to waive a state’s sovereign 
immunity326 also weigh in favor of imposing a similar “clear state-
ment” rule for preempting state legislation in areas otherwise within 
states’ power to regulate.327 
 
319 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); accord English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 
496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990). 
320 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973); see also 
Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300–01 (1988) (holding that the Natu-
ral Gas Act occupies the field of natural gas regulation because it is a “‘comprehensive 
scheme of federal regulation of ‘all wholesales of natural gas in interstate commerce’’” 
and “confers upon FERC exclusive jurisdiction over the transportation and sale of natural 
gas in interstate commerce for resale”) (quoting N. Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. 
Comm’n of Kan., 372 U.S. 84, 91 (1963)). 
321 Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 616–617 (1996) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting); cf. O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 85 (1994) (declin-
ing to adopt a “court-made rule” of preemption “to supplement federal statutory regula-
tion that is comprehensive and detailed; matters left unaddressed in such a scheme are 
presumably left subject to the disposition provided by state law”). 
322 See supra notes 269–71; cf. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 574 (2009) (“If Congress 
thought state-law suits posed an obstacle to its objectives, it surely would have enacted an 
express pre-emption provision at some point during the FDCA’s 70-year history.”). 
323 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288–89 (2001). 
324 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
325 Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726 (2003); see also Dellmuth v. 
Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989) (concluding that “Congress intended to abrogate sover-
eign immunity only if its intention is ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute’” 
(quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985))). 
326 See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242 (holding that Congress must “unequivocally express its in-
tention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment bar”). 
327 Cf. Eskridge, supra note 300, at 1471–72 (explaining that the presumption against 
preemption arises from “constitutional federalism principle[s]”). 
1328 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 17:5 
 
Moreover, when Congress purportedly has the implicit intention 
to preempt an entire field, courts must attempt to intuit the breadth 
of the resulting preemption.  For example, the Court has held that 
Congress has preempted the field concerning “the radiological safety 
aspects involved in the construction and operation of a nuclear 
plant,”328 while also cautioning that “not every state law that in some 
remote way may affect the nuclear safety decisions made by those who 
build and run nuclear facilities can be said to fall within the pre-
empted field.”329  Eliminating field preemption in favor of express 
preemption would alleviate the need for courts to draw such difficult 
lines, or at least guarantee them a more direct textual basis for their 
rulings. 
Daniel Meltzer has argued that courts cannot avoid uncertainty by 
insisting on express preemption rather than attempting to infer 
whether Congress intended field preemption.330  He points out that 
“it is often difficult to ascertain from the text alone just what the 
‘domain’ is that is subject to preemption.”331  Nevertheless, requiring 
Congress to use explicit language in order to preempt state law avoids 
the need for judicial inferences as to Congress’s intent, and provides 
a helpful data point about the scope of such preemption. 
At the very least, the Court should recognize an exception to field 
preemption for reverse nullification, to promote states’ efforts to 
check executive under-enforcement of federal law.  In Arizona v. Unit-
ed States, in contrast, the Supreme Court permitted field preemption 
to be used as a mechanism for protecting such underenforcement.  
The Court invalidated § 3 of S.B. 1070, an Arizona immigration 
measure that made it a misdemeanor for an alien to willfully fail to 
“complete or carry an alien registration document” in violation of 8 
U.S.C. § 1304(e) or § 1306(a).332  As the Court noted, § 3 “adds a 
state-law penalty for conduct proscribed by federal law.”333  The Court 
 
328 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 205 
(1983). 
329 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990). 
330 Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1, 28 (2013). 
331 Id.  Meltzer also contends that express preemption is insufficient because “participants in 
the drafting process, even if strongly motivated, lack the foresight, or sometimes the con-
sensus, that would permit resolution of the range of preemption questions that will even-
tually arise under federal statutory schemes of any complexity.”  Id. at 40–41. 
332 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012) (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 1509(A) (West Supp. 2011)). 
333 Id. 
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held that § 3 was preempted because “the Federal Government has 
occupied the field of alien registration.”334   
Critically, the Court emphasized that states had to be prevented 
from enacting alien registration laws that mirror federal require-
ments to preserve the Executive’s ability to refuse to enforce federal 
law.  It explained:  “Were § 3 to come into force, the State would have 
the power to bring criminal charges against individuals for violating a 
federal law even in circumstances where federal officials in charge of 
the comprehensive scheme determine that prosecution would frus-
trate federal policies.”335  Earlier in the opinion, the Court celebrated 
executive under-enforcement of immigration law, declaring, “Return-
ing an alien to his own country may be deemed inappropriate even 
where he has committed a removable offense or fails to meet the cri-
teria for admission.”336  The Executive’s “enforcement policies,” the 
Court held, must be “consistent with this Nation’s foreign policy,” 
“embrace[] immediate human concerns,” and weigh “[t]he equities 
of [each] individual case.”337 
The Arizona Court seems to be defending what may be called “du-
al preemption”:  the Court barred states from establishing standards 
that mirror federal law, in order to preserve the Executive’s discre-
tion to refrain from enforcing that very law.  Thus, a federal statute 
serves as the basis for nullifying state law, even as executive discretion 
serves as the basis for effectively nullifying that federal statute, either 
in general or in certain categories of cases (categories that Congress 
has not seen fit to exempt from the statute).  The Supremacy Clause 
protects the status of federal statutes as the “Law of the Land.”338  The 
Court should not interpret or apply the Supremacy Clause so as to fa-
cilitate statutes’ desuetude. 
When states enact and enforce provisions that mirror federal law 
in a field in which they possess constitutional authority to legislate, 
their actions are, by definition, consistent with underlying federal 
statute and should not be invalidated.339  Indeed, states routinely ex-
 
334 Id. at 2502. 
335 Id. at 2503.  The Court also was concerned that aliens convicted of violating § 3 would not 
be  who violated federal law would be eligible for parole and presidential pardons.  Id. 
336 Id. at 2499. 
337 Id.; see also United States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 518, 532–33 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(“[A]llowing the state to prosecute individuals for violations of a state law that is highly 
similar to a federal law strips federal officials of [their] discretion.”). 
338 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
339 Cf. Cox, supra note 23, at 43 (“[R]edundent enforcement presents the clearest case 
against preemption one can imagine, because there is no conceptual space between state 
and federal law.”). 
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ercise concurrent enforcement authority with the federal govern-
ment over numerous areas in the absence of express congressional 
authorization.340  The State of New York, for example, has been ag-
gressively pursuing high-end investment firms for which the FEC tra-
ditionally assumed primarily responsibility.341  And approximately two 
dozen federal laws affirmatively authorize direct enforcement by state 
officials.342 
The executive branch’s mere policy preference to refrain from 
enforcing a statute under certain circumstances does not constitute 
part of the “supreme law of the land” that the Supremacy Clause al-
lows to supersede state law.  At most, allowing states to enforce re-
strictions that parallel federal law increases the likelihood that a per-
son will be investigated for engaging in the prohibited conduct, 
thereby raising the effective price of engaging in such conduct or the 
sanction for doing so.343  As Adam Cox points out, the Supreme Court 
generally rejects this Holmesian approach to the law, envisioning law 
“as a set of obligations rather than prices.”344  Moreover, under this 
conception of law, “[o]nce the federal government adopt[s] a partic-
ular legal prohibition . . . anything a state [does] to enforce that pro-
hibition would change the expected sanction,” and therefore be 
preempted.345  Applying this approach transsubstantively would dra-
matically upset the balance of power in our federal system by reduc-
ing the scope of permissible state regulation to the few (if any) re-
maining arenas the federal government has chosen not to regulate. 
Thus, the Supreme Court should not consider the Executive’s 
possible desire to refrain from fully enforcing a statute as a basis for 
concluding that states must be excluded from the field.  If Congress 
wishes to reinforce the Executive’s ability to effectively amend or nul-
lify its enactments by selectively enforcing them, it may do so through 
express preemption of parallel state-law provisions.  The federal judi-
ciary should not tip the scales further in favor of the Executive346 
where Congress itself has not expressly chosen to do so. 
 
340 Id. at 31. 
341 Ahdieh, supra note 316, at 872–73. 
342 Widman & Cox, supra note 317, at 55. 
343 Cf. Cox, supra note 23, at 43–44, 53. 
344 Id. at 44, 53. 
345 Id. at 44. 
346 See generally POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 12 (explaining that the Executive possesses 
extremely broad discretion that is virtually unfettered by legal constraints). 
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IV.  EXECUTIVE UNDERENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL LAW AND REVERSE 
NULLIFICATION 
Reverse nullification is a constitutionally permissible form of self-
help states can implement to secure the benefits of federal statutes 
that the Executive declines to adequately enforce as written.347  Courts 
should not invoke the doctrines of field or obstacle preemption to 
prohibit states from enacting prohibitions, standards, or require-
ments that mirror those set forth in federal law. 
Admittedly, executive underenforcement may serve valuable social 
goals.  Statutes may be overbroad or poorly drafted, sweeping in wide 
ranges of innocuous conduct.  Executive discretion can act as a prac-
tical “fix” when legislative language is unnecessarily or unintentional-
ly overbroad, or experience with implementing the law shows that its 
enforcement under certain circumstances is undesirable.348  Related-
ly, cost-benefit analysis may counsel “rational underenforcement,” on 
the grounds that the social benefits of enforcing the law in certain 
cases is not worth the attendant costs (however they may be meas-
ured).349  Or social norms, technology, or other circumstances may 
substantially change in the years or decades following a law’s enact-
ment, rendering its enforcement under some or all circumstances 
much more objectionable than when the law first entered into effect.  
For these reasons, the Executive often may contend that refraining 
from fully enforcing the law promotes the public interest.  It might 
further argue that underenforcement can be more faithful to the 
preferences of current democratic majorities because the numerous 
vetogates strewn throughout the complex bicameral legislative pro-
cess350 prevent the amendment or repeal of laws that have lost public 
support.351 
Resource constraints also inevitably contribute to 
underenforcement.352  Few law enforcement or administrative agen-
cies possess the funding, personnel, and other resources necessary to 
fully enforce all of the laws for which they are responsible against all 
 
347 See Pozen, supra note 3, at 87–88 (describing the growing efforts of states to enforce laws 
that federal officials do not adequately enforce). 
348 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 3, at 792; Lemos, supra note 21, at 754; Sant’Ambrogio, supra 
note 8, at 383. 
349 Jonathan M. Barnett, The Rational Underenforcement of Vice Laws, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 423, 
426, 431 (2002) (arguing that “underenforcement is the most effective strategy for deter-
ring consensual conduct that violates a widely shared moral norm”). 
350 Eskridge, supra note 300, at 1444–48. 
351 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 3, at 792–93; Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 8, at 377–78, 380. 
352 Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and the Separation of Powers, 112 MICH. 
L. REV. 1195, 1216–17 (2014). 
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possible transgressors.  Tradeoffs almost always must be made in 
terms of investigative and prosecutorial resources.  By deliberately 
declining to attempt to enforce statutes under certain circumstances, 
government agencies can focus their resources to the most serious vi-
olations, or allocate them based on the President’s substantive policy 
preferences.353 
It is questionable whether these types of policy and fairness con-
cerns allow the Executive to unilaterally decline to “[t]ake Care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed” against certain people or under cer-
tain circumstances.354  Persistent underenforcement of the law also 
may give rise to fairness concerns for those against whom it is en-
forced; when nearly everyone on a highway is traveling five miles over 
the speed limit, but only one person is ticketed for doing so, she sure-
ly has at least some valid cause for complaint.355  And 
underenforcement easily can be used to turn enforcement of the law 
into a political tool, rewarding favored constituencies and punishing 
disfavored ones. 
Regardless, even if underenforcement is constitutionally permissi-
ble,356 and, at least sometimes, socially valuable,357 state law should not 
be preempted to bar states from supplementing the Executive’s en-
forcement efforts.  When Congress enacts a statute, it likely recogniz-
es that, due to resource constraints and other practical considera-
tions, full enforcement is unlikely to occur.  This generally does not 
 
353 Andrias, supra note 7, at 1039; Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 8, at 384. 
354 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.  Zachary S. Price contends that “the constitutional principle of 
congressional primacy in lawmaking requires executive officials to focus on effectuating 
statutory policies rather than undermining them through nonenforcement.”  Price, supra 
note 3, at 677.  Kate Andrias, in contrast, argues that the President’s “enforcement pow-
er” includes the authority to decline to enforce certain laws under some circumstances in 
order to focus law enforcement resources on situations that more directly promote his 
political agenda.  Andrias, supra note 7, at 1039. 
355 It appears that the Supreme Court disagrees.  See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 
591, 604 (2008) (“[A]llowing an equal protection claim on the ground that a ticket was 
given to one person and not others, even if for no discernible or articulable reason, 
would be incompatible with the discretion inherent in the challenged action.”).  Cf. 
Cristian Farias, The Chief Justice Has Never Been Pulled Over in His Life, SLATE (Feb. 11, 2015, 
9:36 AM), available at http://tinyurl.com/m55uvxp (arguing that a majority of Supreme 
Court Justices do not understand a motorist’s experience during a traffic stop because 
they have never experienced one). 
356 See supra notes 2, 11 (discussing the constitutionality of underenforcement by the execu-
tive). 
357 See Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1720 (2006) 
(“[D]istinguishing ‘good’ underenforcement from ‘bad’ poses an analytic challenge.”); 
see also Barnett, supra note 349, at 431 (finding a benefit to underenforcement).  Cf. 
Lemos, supra note 21, at 702–03 (recognizing that state enforcement of federal laws may 
sometimes be beneficial to ameliorate underenforcement). 
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constitute an affirmative grant of discretion to the Executive to ex-
empt certain offenders from the law, or remove certain types of of-
fenses from the scope of the statute.  That is, even if the President has 
discretion to refrain from enforcing a statute under certain circum-
stances, the Supremacy Clause does not include such decisions as 
part of the “law of the land” which may displace state law.358 
Both the Court and commentators have addressed the circum-
stances under which federal executive or administrative agencies 
should be permitted to preempt state law.359  The Court gives agen-
cies’ preemption decisions the most deference when they promulgate 
a “regulation bearing the force of law.”360  Non-enforcement decisions 
and policies do not rise to that level.  To the contrary, 
underenforcement general is at the very least in tension with the text 
of the underlying statute.361  Beyond that, the ultimate source of the 
preemption authority remains the underlying statute itself; an agency 
may not bootstrap itself into preempting state law without statutory 
authorization. 362  Thus, federal administrative or prosecutorial discre-
tion does not constitute an independent basis for preventing concur-
rent state enforcement of standards set forth in federal statutes. 
Periodically throughout our Nation’s history, states have attempt-
ed to combat federal statutes they believed to be unconstitutional 
through nullification.  Today, it is the federal Executive that, for a 
 
358 Cf. Cox, supra note 23, at 54 (“[T]he practical consequence of the Court’s approach in 
Arizona is to elevate prosecutorial decisions by executive branch officials to the status of 
law for purposes of preemption analysis.”). 
359 See, e.g., Brian Galle, Administrative Law’s Federalism:  Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at 
the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933 (2008) (arguing for a more nuanced set of 
rules that would permit agencies in many instances to preempt or regulate without the 
need for express congressional approval); Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agen-
cy Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 695, 695–699 (2008) (arguing for a presumption against 
agency preemption); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism, and Admin-
istrative Law:  Agency Power to Preempt State Regulation, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 607 (1985) (argu-
ing that federal agencies can play a valuable role in checking state regulation that is 
harmful to national interests); Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
869 (2008) (describing the problems with preemption based on regulations, orders, or 
other agency activity). 
360 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 580 (2009). 
361 Underenforcement differs from a situation where an agency exercises its discretion under 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to define certain 
terms narrowly, or adopt narrow implementing regulations as a policy matter, to mini-
mize the amount of conduct a statute prohibits.  If an agency goes too far in attempting 
to underenforce a statute by regulation in this manner, it generally is subject to challenge 
under the Administrative Procedures Act.  See, e.g., Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 
2008) (invaliding FEC regulations that did not adequately implement the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act). 
362 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 884–85 (2000). 
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mix of practical, ideological, and occasionally constitutional reasons, 
effectively amends or even nullifies federal statutes by declining to 
enforce them, either in general or particular cases.  The Court 
should modify obstacle and field preemption doctrines to allow states 
to engage in reverse nullification of federal law by enforcing state 
laws that mirror federal prohibitions or requirement unless Congress 
has expressly preempted state laws on the issue or affirmatively au-
thorized or licensed certain conduct.  This reform would be based on 
a more accurate interpretation of the Supremacy Clause and allow 
states to provide an alternative mechanism for enforcing the “law of 
the land.” 
